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CONSTITUTIONAL FALSE POSITIVES AND THE
POPULIST MOMENT
Gerard N. Magliocca*
We are engaged in just such a contest as every generation must
pass through. In times of quiet, abuses spring up.... The people
suffer until suffering ceases to be a virtue; they are patient until pa-
tience is exhausted, and then they arouse themselves, take the reins
of government and put the government back upon its old
foundation.
William Jennings Bryan (1896)1
The liberty mentioned in . . . [the Fourteenth] amendment means
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person . . . [but] to pursue any livelihood or avoca-
tion, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential .... [W]e do not intend to hold
that in no such case can the state exercise its police power. When
and how far such power may be legitimately exercised with regard
to these subjects must be left for determination to each case as it
arises.
Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)2
INTRODUCTION
You have probably never heard of the Punktation of Olmutz. 3 In
the fall of 1850, however, the great European powers were on the
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. Many
thanks to Brian C. Kalt, Amanda L. Tyler, and the participants at the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools Conference for their comments.
1 WILLIAMJ. BRYAN, THE FIRST BATrLE: A STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1896, at 596
(Chicago, W.B. Conkey & Co. 1896).
2 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897).
3 This example comes from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, whose course in game
theory and war was a memorable part of my undergraduate education. See BRUCE
BUENO DE MESQUITA & DAVID LALMAN, WAR AND REAFSON: DOMESTIC AND INTERNA-
TIONAL IMPERATIVES (1992) (setting forth a predictive model for war).
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brink of war over this dispute in the German state of Hesse.4 As Prus-
sia and France ordered a general mobilization, the Times stated that
this was "'a bloody drama that is now unfolding ... and that nobody
will triumph in except Germany's enemies.' " 5 Fortunately, cooler
heads prevailed and the crisis was defused. 6 Like the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the Punktation of Olmutz had all the hallmarks of a war but did
not lead to one.
This story describes a false positive, which is something that meets
the criteria for a particular outcome yet does not yield that result.
Perhaps the best example of this is a medical test that indicates the
presence of an illness when none exists, but the concept is not limited
to biology. Researchers in the social sciences must also incorporate
false positives into their work to get an accurate view of a phenome-
non. For instance, a scholar cannot create a sound theory of how wars
happen by looking only at wars that happen. That would present a
misleading picture because the study would be using incomplete data
skewed toward a particular segment of the underlying pattern.
Constitutional theory is probably the only major discipline that
ignores false positives. While there is no lack of interest on how
higher law is made or interpreted, almost all of those analyses focus
on when authority is established while skipping over the near misses
and false starts.7 It is understandable that lawyers are more interested
in concrete achievements like constitutional text or judicial opinions,
since they are the reference points that bind courts. Taking that ap-
proach for developing an interpretive model, however, is flawed for
the same reason that ignoring the Punktation of Olmutz hurts a war
model-it omits key evidence and lets false premises go unchal-
lenged. In constitutional theory, this distortion is particularly acute
4 See id. at 115-17. The crisis was the result of competition between Prussia and
Austria for influence within the German Confederation. See id. at 114-15. Russia said
that any attack on Hesse by Prussia would be deemed an act of war, France was pre-
paring to help Russia "dismember" Prussia, and England's view was uncertain. See id.
at 116.
5 Id. at 116 (quoting Collision Between the Armies in Hesse, TIMES (London), Nov.
13, 1850, at 6).
6 See id. at 116-17.
7 One prominent exception is Robert M. Cover's discussion of the 'jurisgenera-
rive" and "jurispathic" aspects of law. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983) (recognizing that
courts both create and destroy law by choosing between the arguments in a case sug-
gests the existence of paths not taken that must be considered for a complete picture
of how doctrine evolves).
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because the set of canonical events (or data points) that academics
and judges usually rely upon is small.8
This Article starts filling that gap by exploring the most powerful
constitutional false positive in our history-the rise and fall of the
Populist Party in the 1890s.9 Rising from the heartland like a prairie
fire, this coalition of agrarian interests and disaffected industrial work-
ers went from a group of rabble-rousers to the brink of power in only
8 SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-101 (1980) (building an in-
terpretive theory on footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938), and on a set of textual clauses); Mark A. Graber, Desperately Duck-
ing Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT.
271, 271 (1997) ("Contemporary constitutional theory rests on three premises. Brown
v. Board of Education was correct, Lochner v. New York was wrong, and Dred Scott v.
Sandford was also wrong.").
9 While this Article looks at the economic doctrine implicated by the Populist
false positive, two other essays will examine its influence on the application of the Bill
of Rights to the states and on racial justice. A theme of all three pieces is that the
reaction against Populism by the legal establishment sharply redefined the Four-
teenth Amendment and moved the law away from the goals of Reconstruction. See
infra text accompanying notes 52-55.
On incorporation, the Supreme Court's decisions were influenced by antagonism
towards Populism. The first case raising a comprehensive incorporation claim in-
volved the Haymarket Rioters, who were so loathed by conservatives that their appeal
was called The Anarchists' Case. SeeExparteSpies (The Anarchists' Case), 123 U.S. 131
(1887); Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A Reinterpretation of
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 711-12 (2000). Likewise, the first part
of the Bill of Rights applied to the states was the Takings Clause-in a case decided
right after William Jennings Bryan's defeat-and this set up an obstacle to any future
redistributive programs. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 241 (1897); infra notes 343-53 and accompanying text. Before the mid-1890s,
almost every Justice who stated a view on pure incorporation said the Fourteenth
Amendment did extend the Bill of Rights to the states. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323, 361-64 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 370-71 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
Yet the Justices did not take up this question until 1900, when they rejected the idea
for everything other than the Takings Clause. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
601-02 (1900). The intervening event that caused this about-face was the Populist
false positive.
On race relations, the Populist Party was the most egalitarian force in the South
between the Civil War and the Civil Rights Movement. According to the famous thesis
of C. Vann Woodward, it was the response to the Populists-not the withdrawal of
federal troops in 1877-that led to the disenfranchisement of African Americans and
to the segregation validated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 77-90 (3d ed. 2002). With the foun-
dation laid in this essay, Woodward's argument can be considered in a constitutional
context. This reversal in federalism priorities from Reconstruction (more national
protection for property and less for race) was part of a broader adjustment in the
balance between local and federal authority triggered by the Pullman Railroad Strike
of 1894. See infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
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ten years. 10 In the course of that decade, the Populists presented one
of the most radical reform programs ever supported by a major party
in a presidential campaign.1 That agenda was accompanied by a lu-
cid critique of the legal order and a claim that the Supreme Court
needed a drastic overhaul. 12 Love them or hate them, the Populists at
their peak had the vision and the will to remake constitutional lawjust
as the Framers and the Reconstruction Republicans did.' 3 The differ-
ence is that the Populists lost the 1896 election and never recovered. 14
That defeat did not just prevent Populist ideas from coming to
pass. A constitutional false positive actually moves the law away from
what the doomed reformers supported. There is a deep truth under-
lying this assertion, which is that almost every movement for broad
legal change triggers strong opposition. 15 Since scholars tend to focus
on the times when the resistance is overcome and reformers win,
those tactics are usually dismissed as stubborn "mistakes" with no last-
10 For an overview of Populism, see H.W. BRANDS, THE RECKLESS DECADE:
AMERICA IN THE 1890s (1995); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA (1978);JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST
REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMERS' ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE'S PARTY (1961); RICH-
ARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955).
11 See HICKS, supra note 10, at 439-44 (reproducing the Populist platform of
1892, which called for fiat money, a progressive income tax, public ownership of rail-
roads and utilities, a secret ballot, the direct election of Senators, and limiting the
President to one term).
12 See JAMES B. WEAVER, A CALL TO ACTION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE GREAT
UPRISING, ITS SOURCES AND CAUSES 67-135 (Des Moines, Iowa Printing Co., 1892);
infra notes 322-31 and accompanying text; see also 2 ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1828-29 (1971) (quoting the 1896 plat-
form of William Jennings Bryan, which denounced the Court's recent opinions and
suggested their "reversal by the court as it may hereafter be constituted").
13 The forthcoming discussion should not be read as a nafve endorsement of
Populist ideology, which was, among other things, backward-looking, nativist, anti-
Semitic, and conspiratorial. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 10, at 60-93.
14 Of course, many ideas that the Populists championed were adopted in later
decades, so it is an oversimplification to say that the movement lost. The point is that
the Populist Party never gained power, and hence its unique constitutional philoso-
phy was never implemented. For more on the crucial 1896 campaign, see ROBERT F.
DURDEN, THE CLIMAX OF POPULISM: THE ELECTION OF 1896 (1965); STANLEY L. JONES,
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1896 (1964).
15 See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM
JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 38 (2d ed. 1997); see also ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 315 (1941) ("The judiciary is thus the check of a
preceding generation on the present one; a check of conservative legal philosophy




ing impact. 16 In a false positive, however, conservatives win and their
defensive actions establish the baseline for a new set of governing
principles.
This was the scenario that played out in the 1890s, as the Populist
false positive hurled the law onto a new path that still leaves experts
scratching their heads. It was in 1897, right after Populism's defeat,
that judges first identified the "liberty of contract" in the Due Process
Clause and thus began the Lochner era of greater scrutiny over eco-
nomic and social legislation. 17 That landmark was foreshadowed by a
trio of groundbreaking cases in 1895 that marked the parameters for
federal power until the 1930s.18 The first one concluded, in what one
observer describes as a "stunning defeat," that Congress's reach over
interstate commerce did not cover manufacturing and therefore the
Sherman Act could not be applied to the sugar trust.19 Another held
that federal judges could enjoin strikes to protect interstate com-
16 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (trig-
gering the clash between the Court and the New Deal by holding that the National
Industrial Recovery Act exceeded Congress's power); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1857) (denying national citizenship to African Americans and voiding
the Missouri Compromise); see also Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE L.J. 875, 900-02 (2003) (describing preemptive
opinions).
17 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897) (invalidating a law bar-
ring maritime insurance contracts with a company that did not comply with other
state policies); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (voiding a maximum
hours law for bakers for violating the liberty of contract).
18 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I1), 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895)
(voiding a federal income tax as inconsistent with the Direct Tax Clause); In re Debs,
158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895) (holding that federal courts could enjoin strikes); United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (reading the Sherman Antitrust Act
narrowly to avoid constitutional difficulties under the Commerce Clause). This does
not mean that the specific rules in these cases were controlling until the 1930s
(though the holding in Debs was). Rather, the decisions symbolize the turn triggered
by the Populist false positive. Before 1895, the Court never invalidated a federal tax
on constitutional grounds. See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 25 (1999). After 1895, it did so more than once. See, e.g., United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1936) (voiding a regulatory tax on agriculture
because farming was "a purely local activity"). Similarly, before 1895 the Justices
largely ignored the affirmative reach of the Commerce Clause. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (stating that until the late nineteenth century "the
Court's Commerce Clause decisions dealt rarely with the extent of Congress' power").
After 1895, however, that provision became the focal point for most assertions of fed-
eral power. See infra notes 104-22 and accompanying text.
19 See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16; OWEN M. Fiss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE
MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 112 (1993). E.C. Knight was not as controversial for
Populists as Pollock H and Debs because the latter two struck at the core of their plat-
form. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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merce, but only after the Justices strained to find the broadest possible
basis for decision.20 Finally, the Court voided the federal income tax
and overturned nearly a century of precedent in a move that William
Howard Taft called one of its biggest mistakes. 21 On these issues and
others that shifted during the 1890s, scholars confront the legal
equivalent of Planet X-a hidden force that still exerts an observable
pull. Once the concept of a false positive is introduced, however, the
mystery is solved. Hostility to Populist values drove these rulings, and
that ire was so intense that it actually altered the Constitution's mean-
ing in ways that still affect us.
22
Part I of this Article looks at the role of resistance in constitu-
tional law and explains how false positives can reshape doctrine. Part
II explores the roots and agenda of the Populists in an age of class
division and rapid industrialization. Part III recounts the mounting
tension between these upstarts and the political establishment that
culminated in President Grover Cleveland's decision to use troops to
break the Pullman Railroad Strike, an act that transformed the mean-
ing of federalism for a generation. Part IV shifts the focus to the Su-
preme Court and documents how the Justices also vigorously
intervened against the Populist tide. Part V follows the 1896 cam-
paign between William McKinley and William Jennings Bryan and fo-
cuses on the debate over Bryan's implied threat to engage in Court-
packing if he won. Finally, Part VI reveals how the case law evolved
after the McKinley-Bryan showdown to guard against a Populist come-
20 See Debs, 158 U.S. at 599; Fiss, supra note 19, at 61-62 (remarking that the case
"raised profound questions about the constitutional system and called for answers
that were couched in the highest terms of generality"). For an excellent analysis of
how the major cases of this era, including Debs, were shaped by the Populist move-
ment, see L.H. LaRue, Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L. REV.
373 (1987).
21 See I ARCHIBALD BuTT, TAFT AND ROOSEVELT 134 (1930); see also Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock 1), 157 U.S. 429, 608 (1895) (White,J., dissenting)
("[T]he result of the opinion... just announced is to overthrow a long and consistent
line of decisions, and to deny to the legislative department of the government the
possession of a power conceded to it by universal consensus for one hundred
years . . ").
22 See Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[B]y much eloquent
speech this court has been urged to stand in the breach for the protection of the just
rights of property against the advancing hosts of socialism."); Debs, 158 U.S. at 599
("[T]he means of redress of all wrongs are through the courts and at the ballot-box,
and that no wrong, real or fancied, carries with it the legal warrant to invite as a
means of redress the cooperation of a mob . . . ."); see also Edward S. Corwin, The
Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines, 17 AM. HIsT. REV. 52, 66
(1911) (stating that in "the middle nineties ... the Supreme Court began to regard
itself as the last defense of the country against socialism").
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back and redefined the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that inaugu-
rated the era of laissez-faire constitutionalism.
I. THE VIRTUES OF STANDING ATHWART HISTORY
This Part develops a framework for understanding constitutional
false positives by assessing how opposition contributes to the creation
of law. There are some general lessons that can be drawn from the
efforts of constitutional conservatives. 23 For present purposes, the
main point is that while unsuccessful resistance can deepen the scope
of change by forcing reformers to intensify their efforts, when that
resistance prevails it can also enlarge the scope of a reformist defeat
into what effectively becomes a new legal regime.
A. The Power of Negation
The utility of opposition is presupposed by the adversarial shape
of our legal institutions. At its core, resistance is just another way of
describing debate. Aggressive questioning of reform proposals is
healthy because it exposes flaws that might exist and stops bad ideas in
their tracks. Moreover, these criticisms frequently improve what
emerges from the deliberative process. After all, that is how the Bill of
Rights came into being. The Framers did not think that these protec-
tions were necessary, but the conservatives of the time-the Antifeder-
alists-strongly disagreed and extracted the first ten amendments as a
concession in exchange for support on the original Constitution's rati-
fication.24 Thus, it is vital for people to give voice to their objec-
tions-not just because they have a right to speak, but because they
serve a useful filtering role even if they are in the minority.
Along with refining the content of constitutional reform, resis-
tance can sometimes alter the mode through which those concepts
are expressed. In this respect, the Fourteenth Amendment also owes
its existence to conservatives. The 39th Congress first tried to protect
basic rights and extend citizenship to African Americans (and many
Native Americans) through the Civil Rights Act of 1866.25 President
23 The text is talking about conservatives with a small "c" (i.e., anybody who is
against radical change). The title of this Part, however, refers to William F. Buckley's
slogan for The National Review, which is clearly a big "C" publication.
24 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 575-81 (Alexander Hamilton) Uacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (attacking a bill of rights); GORDON S. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969) (outlining the Antifederalist response and
James Madison's decision to accept that view).
25 See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71-83
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Andrew Johnson, however, vetoed the bill as unconstitutional and in-
voked traditional principles of white supremacy and federalism to sup-
port his conclusion. 26 To overcome this opposition and secure the
Act from challenge, Reconstruction Republicans passed Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.27 IfJohnson had signed the Civil Rights
Act, the Amendment we know would not exist. Instead, its substance
would have migrated to the Thirteenth Amendment or the other tex-
tual provisions on which the Act relied. As a result, the enemies of
constitutional transformation sometimes alter its form but not its
effect.
2 8
On the other hand, resistance helps burnish the legitimacy of any
change that does occur. Rules of recognition and procedural integ-
rity do confer authority on the actions of deliberative bodies, but the
more a topic is discussed the more likely it is that people will accept
the outcome. A statutory provision inserted in the middle of the night
and passed without debate gets the same formal approval in a legisla-
ture as a free-standing bill that is contested for months before passage,
but these acts do not command the same respect. The airing of griev-
ances that forces proponents to defend their rationale leads neutral
parties to conclude that whatever decision is made represents the con-
sidered view of a majority and not the work of a few insiders who are
manipulating the system. Accordingly, conservatives spoiling for a
fight face a sobering prospect-their opposition may end up strength-
ening the mandate for measures they are trying to defeat.29 In other
words, standing on principle can sometimes backfire.
(1986); see also Magliocca, supra note 16, at 944-45 (discussing the impact of the Civil
Rights Act on Native Americans).
26 Andrew Johnson, Veto Message (Mar. 27, 1866) (vetoing the Civil Rights Act),
in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at
405, 405-13 (James D. Richardson ed., 1899) [hereinafter MESSAGES].
27 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 114 (1990). Con-
gress did override the President's veto, but only after the Senate expelled a Demo-
cratic member to get the necessary margin. See 2 BRUCE ACIERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
173 (1998). This left the Act open to a challenge on procedural grounds (i.e., the
override was illegitimate) and on substantive grounds, as Johnson's contention that
the Act was unconstitutional gave this position credibility when litigation ensued.
28 The situation during Reconstruction was more complex than the text indi-
cates, because Johnson's failed resistance also ended up enhancing other parts of the
reform agenda beyond what would have occurred otherwise. See RICHARD A. PRIMUS,
THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RiGHTS 160-68 (1999) (showing how the Fifteenth
Amendment evolved in response to conservative opposition to Reconstruction); infra
notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
29 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 27, at 164 (describing the paradox of resistance).
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That risk is compounded by the idea, which is central to an analy-
sis of constitutional false positives, that fierce resistance also polarizes
the debate and leads reformers to increase their demands beyond
what they would have settled for initially. This behavior should be
familiar to anyone with experience in civil litigation, but another ex-
ample from Reconstruction makes the point even better. In 1861, the
Republican Party held that slavery should be abolished only in the
territories, as Lincoln explained in his First Inaugural.3 0 In 1865,
these same Republicans ratified an amendment abolishing slavery eve-
rywhere.3 1 What explains this dramatic turn? The best answer is that
citizens and officials in the North were radicalized by the Confeder-
acy's intransigence. Certainly this was a rational response to the in-
creasing costs of the Civil War, as voters could have reasoned that only
more sweeping objectives could justify those costs. Yet there was also
an emotional component to this reaction. Simply put, people get an-
gry when confronted with steadfast (or what looks like unreasonable)
opposition. In that exercised state, they begin rejecting modest mea-
sures in favor of more radical solutions out of a sense of outrage or
from a desire for revenge. 32 Thus, resisting change entails risks not
only because it might increase the legitimacy of reform, but because it
often increases the scope of reform.
To capture how opposition can boomerang against its practition-
ers, the best analogy comes from the renowned war scholar Carl von
Clausewitz and his principle of mutual transformation.3 3 The Prus-
sian's dictum that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with
other means" can be turned on its head to show that politics and war
30 See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) ("I have no pur-
pose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states
where it exists."), in LEND ME YOUR EARS: GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY 742, 742 (Wil-
liam Safire ed., 1992) [hereinafter GREAT SPEECHES].
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
32 One of the things that made Lincoln unique was his benign emotional re-
sponse that Divine Providence was behind the opposition for its own reasons. See
RONALD C. WHITE, JR., LINCOLN'S GREATEST SPEECH: THE SECOND INAUGURAL 18-19
(2002) (quoting Lincoln's view that "'[t]he Almighty has his own purposes'" and
wondering if "'He gives to both North and South, this terrible war, as the woe due to
those by whom the offense [of slavery] came'").
33 See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75-77 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832); see also GARRY WILLS, CERTAIN TRUMPETS: THE
CALL OF LEADERS 86 (1994) (calling mutual transformation the insight that "[e]ach
side is increasingly enraged by the other's efforts to meet violence with greater
violence").
2006]
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also share a lot in common. 34 In both instances, there is a tension
between the rational objectives pursued and the passions stirred up
for (and needed to motivate) the people fighting for these goals.
Clausewitz said it was "an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civi-
lized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of
their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of
passion. '3 5 These emotions tend to drive parties in conflict toward
extremes. The intense feelings unleashed by war and constitutional
law escalate because they are part of a competition between different
sides that react to what the other does.36 Clausewitz called this the
mutual transformation of forces, wherein an act by one side "compels
its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must
lead, in theory, to extremes."3 7 This instinct to respond with greater
strength rests to some extent on uncertainty about the outcome, be-
cause "so long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to
fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to
me as much as I dictate to him."38 Conflicts also escalate because each
camp tries to use just enough force to achieve its goals, and therefore
a cycle of marginal retaliation is likely as they probe each other's re-
solve and challenge each other for supremacy.39 Naturally, there is a
limit to this principle because eventually one side is overwhelmed or
capitulates when the costs of continuing become too great. As the
slavery example shows, however, the final product of this interaction
34 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 33, at 69; see RicHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE
248-58 (1999) (using war theory to explain the Clinton impeachment saga). These
similarities should not be overstated since one activity involves violence and the other
does not. Nevertheless, war and constitutional politics are both conducted in an at-
mosphere of high uncertainty. See id. at 249-50. Moreover, luck plays a critical role
in shaping their respective outcomes, though in the law that fact is not given enough
recognition. See CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 33, at 85 ("No other human activity is so
continuously or universally bound up with chance [as is war]."); Gerard N. Magliocca,
Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U.
PiTr. L. REv. 487, 561 (2002) (explaining how the sudden death of President William
Henry Harrison was the only thing that saved McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), from being overruled).
35 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 33, at 76.
36 See id. at 77 (stating that war "is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless
mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all) but always the collision of two living
forces").
37 Id. (calling this the first extreme of war).
38 Id. (characterizing this as the second extreme of war).
39 See id. (labeling this the third extreme of war); see also id. (explaining that once
enemy resistance is assessed "you can adjust your own efforts accordingly .... But the
enemy will do the same; competition will again result and, in pure theory, it must
again force you both to extremes").
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often looks quite different from the parties' initial expectations. 40 In
sum, unsuccessful resistance carries the risk of turning a modest set-
back into a catastrophic defeat.
B. False Positives Defined
All of the scenarios discussed thus far assume that conservatives
do not succeed in their effort to defeat change, but that is not always
true. Most of the time victorious resistance just preserves the status
quo. 4 1 Yet if the threat posed by reformers is strong and they still fail
(i.e., the requirements for a false positive are met), then the process
of mutual transformation moves in the other direction. Rather than
exaggerating the impact of reform, the opposition creates authorities
that state an aggressive set of principles rejecting the change move-
ment.42 Those actions then remain in place and become the new ref-
erence points that courts use to implement this constitutional
"negative implication" as doctrine.
While anger is behind many reformers' efforts to sharpen their
demands in the face of resistance, fear is the driving force for conserv-
atives seeking to stop change. To borrow another concept from Clau-
sewitz, in war and constitutional politics people frequently overstate
the consequences of defeat and fill "the stage with scenery crudely
daubed with fearsome apparitions." 43 Even the most sober lawyers dis-
play signs of panic when their principles come under attack by a new
popular movement.44 Indeed, there is a regular pattern in our higher
law under which officials conclude that extraordinary acts of resis-
tance must be taken to save the Constitution from destruction, even if
40 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
41 After all, in most situations reform proposals either have little support or seek
to implement fairly minor changes. In these circumstances, the intensity of feeling
that is necessary for an escalation is simply not present.
42 A prior work of mine describes the most powerful act of judicial resistance as a
"preemptive opinion." See Magliocca, supra note 34, at 491-510. Though that cate-
gory is explored in the Pollock decisions, see infra note 250 and accompanying text,
one difference between that case and the other members of this select group, e.g.,
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832), is that the latter were swept aside in their time because reformers
won.
43 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 33, at 118; see id. at 117 (discussing the concept of
friction in war and noting that most soldiers "tend to exaggerate the bad news").
44 See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 960
(1988) (quotingJohn Marshall's reaction to the rise ofJacksonian Democracy and his
statement that "I yield slowly and reluctantly to the conviction that our Constitution
cannot last").
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that means striking against the insuruents before they assume power.45
In effect, a constitutional false positive stands at the opposite end ot
the cycle of mutual transformation described in the last Part.46
Continuing with this inverse parallel, just as conservatives can ac-
celerate the pace of change with resistance, reformers who fail risk
triggering a backlash that can push the new legal equilibrium to a
position much less friendly to their cause than where it stood before
their movement began. Ironically, the most successful defenses of the
status quo (measured by the stakes involved) can still end up chang-
ing the law dramatically. Since the main goal of resistance is to dis-
credit reform, conservatives are often presented with a choice
between applying precedent (even if that means letting their foes ob-
tain some concrete political victories) and recasting the law to ensure
that the reformers lose. There is no consistent answer to that di-
lemma, but in many cases fear of defeat outweighs respect for the
rules.4 7 The leading example is Dred Scott v. Sandford,48 in which the
Supreme Court held that the Republican goal of barring slavery in the
territories was unconstitutional even though the precedents did not
come close to supporting such a conclusion.
49
That kind of judicial performance indicates how a false positive
can reshape the law. Consider for a moment how doctrine would
have developed following Dred Scott if Democrats had won their de-
bate with Republicans in 1860. In that case, Chief Justice Taney's
opinion would have altered doctrine merely by withstanding attack, as
its distortions forged under political pressure would have become a
new fixed point forjudicial reasoning. In addition, the opinion would
be seen as the new model for courts-a heroic decision that was criti-
cized but then vindicated by the people, much as Brown v. Board of
45 See I THE AMERICAN PARTY BATTLE: ELECTION CAMPAIGN PAMPHLETS 1828-1876,
at 36 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1999) [hereinafter PAMPHLETS] (describing the Jacksonian
view "that the Republicans posed a particular threat to the nation's safety.... and had
to be put down"); infra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
46 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
47 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-61 (1832) (asserting
that Native Americans had broad sovereignty and that the federal government had
exclusive power over interactions with the tribes); Magliocca, supra note 16, at
898-903 (explaining that these conclusions were not supported by existing doctrine
but were inspired by opposition to Jacksonian Democracy).
48 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
49 See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) ("In
legislating for [the territories], Congress exercises the combined powers of the gen-
eral, and of a state government."). See generally THOMAS HART BENTON, EXAMINATION
OF THE DRED ScoTr CASE (photo. reprint 1969) (1857) (making the same point).
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Education5 ° is viewed today. Indeed, judges in that scenario would not
be stretching matters much in concluding that the electorate had en-
dorsed an emphatic move away from what the defeated reformers be-
lieved.51 And once courts get shoved in that direction, they are
unlikely to change course for years. The law that then emerges will be
quite different from how the background principles would have
evolved if no Republican challenge (and no Dred Scott) had occurred
at all.
This hypothetical, which closely tracks how the 1890s actually un-
folded, also shows why the exclusion of false positives wreaks havoc on
legal theory.52 The problem is that any acts of resistance must utilize
existing constitutional text, as there is rarely enough time to pass an
Article Five amendment to stop reform.53 If the reformers are de-
feated, judges in subsequent years will apply the principles laid down
by these acts of resistance as though they were normal extensions of
the constitutional provision's original understanding. Thus, if the in-
tervening false positive is ignored, scholars will either get a false view
of what the clauses meant or a negative view of the Justices reading
them. In the example discussed here, the decisions from the Populist
era lead some scholars to attribute values to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that are not there, while others wonder why the Court did such
a poor job in preserving the text's meaning. 54 The answer is that
these judges were faithfully construing the backlash of the 1890s as if
it was a constitutional amendment. 55
50 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51 This happened in an affirmative fashion several times, most notably during the
New Deal when the Court concluded (under duress) that the people were endorsing
a new set of principles based on enhanced federal and state power over economic
matters. SeeJAci. soN, supra note 15, at vi. (stating that the Justices "confessed legal
error and saved themselves from political humiliation").
52 Though the text refers only to the 1890s, this period is not the only false posi-
tive in our constitutional history. In 1840, the Whig Party won control of the political
branches and threatened to roll back the work of Jacksonian Democracy. See Mag-
liocca, supra note 34, at 565-70. The Whigs failed in that effort so quickly, though,
that this period did not see a sustained backlash. See id. at 570.
53 In 1861, the Democrats did try to pass an amendment that would have ex-
pressly protected slavery, but this was not ratified by the states. See EDWARD MCPHER-
SON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE GREAT
REBELLION 59-60 (Washington, D.C., Philip & Solomons 1864).
54 Certainly not all of the distortions that occurred in this period involved the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, this is the part of the Populist false positive
that is most relevant for modern constitutional theory. See supra note 9; see also infra
Part VI.
55 One point that should be clarified is that this Article draws no normative con-
clusions about the legitimacy of change caused by a false positive. Without a doubt,
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Accordinylv, a constitutional false positive is part of the natural
give-and-take that occurs when sharply divergent phhlosopnles conicte
in a political arena. Just as fierce resistance magnifies the scope of a
reformist victory, so too does it intensify the power of a conservative
triumph. The Populist moment witnessed the greatest popular mobil-
ization in our history that ever failed, and a close look at those years
shows how a false positive can warp the fabric of the law.
II. THE BANNER OF REFORM Is HOISTED
This Part probes the background of the Populist Party and ex-
plains the philosophy that its leaders brought into the mainstream. At
its heart, Populism was an agrarian movement that followed in the
footsteps of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democracy by insisting that
the wealthy were abusing their power and threatening democracy.
56
Unlike their forebears, however, the Populists responded to this crisis
by holding that the government needed more authority to counter
the influence of business.5 7 In particular, they gave a new reading to
the Commerce Clause that made it a strong tool for federal action and
began a shift in how lawyers assessed the reach of Congress.
A. Discontent at the Grass Roots
Farmers in the late nineteenth century sensed that their status
was in decline due to forces that they could not control. In 1893,
Frederick Jackson Turner advanced his argument that the frontier was
central to the American experience and that its disappearance had
there is a strong argument that distortions of constitutional meaning done in the
name of opposing "dangerous" reforms are illegitimate. Even if this view is correct,
though, the acts of resistance remain and should be assessed.
56 See EDWARD IRVING, BREAKERS AHEAD!: AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WHERE
ARE WE AT? 59 (Stockton, Cal., T.W. Hummel Co. 1894) ("There is but one party
which is ready, willing and eager to tear from off the people the OCTOPUS CLASP of
the money power. That party is the PEOPLE'S PARTY."); THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 259 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1993)
("Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God.... ."); AndrewJackson,
Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 576, 590 (vetoing the
Bank of the United States because "[m]any of our rich men have not been content
with equal protection and equal benefits, but have besought us to make them richer
by act of Congress").
57 Compare PAMPHLETS, supra note 45, at 16 (quoting a Jacksonian mantra that
"'It] he only use of government is... to keep[ ] off evil. We do not want its assistance in
seeking after good"'), with WILLIAM A. PEFFER, POPULISM, ITS RISE AND FALL 175 (Peter
H. Argersinger ed., Univ. Press of Kan. 1992) (1899) ("Populists believe in the exer-




significant consequences. 58 Though this particular view is contested,
Turner's metaphor did capture the reality that rural life was in the
midst of a painful transition brought on by the Industrial Revolu-
tion. 59 Innovations in technology raised the productivity of agricul-
ture and linked regional markets into one global market. 60 That
surge in available goods led to a sustained deflation in prices that
made it increasingly difficult for farmers to obtain credit. 61 Indeed,
the only way to survive was by mortgaging part of a current crop to buy
seed and equipment for the next year. This "crop-lien" plan, though,
just served to deepen the debt cycle in a deflationary time.
62
Mounting debts were not the only problem facing farmers, as
they also found their livelihood increasingly controlled by corporate
interests. The independent yeoman of old now depended on banks
for loans, grain elevators for storing produce, and railroads for bring-
ing goods to market. None of these industries were regulated, and so
all of them could charge discriminatory rates because they held a sig-
nificant bargaining advantage over individual farmers. 63 Further-
more, rural voters thought that trusts had a stranglehold on
government and were using that influence to turn farmers into serfs.
64
Thomas E. Watson, the firebrand who became the Populist leader in
the South, expressed these fears in vivid language:
These Corporations are the Feudal Barons of this Century.
Their Directors live in lordly Palaces and Castles .... They keep
58 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 22-27. See generally FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER,
THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HIsTORY (1920) (laying out this view).
59 For the classic rebuttal to Turner's view that the agrarian revolt in the 1890s
was caused by the scarcity of open land, see HOFSTADTER, supra note 10, at 47-57
(noting that Populism was also strong in areas where the frontier had vanished long
before the 1890s and that other factors were more relevant).
60 See HICKS, supra note 10, at 57-59; see also Louis W. KOENIG, BRYAN: A POLITI-
CAL BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 67-68 (1971) (explaining how the boost
in production influenced rural life).
61 See GOODWYN, supra note 10, at 69; see also HICKS, supra note 10, at 55 ("The
period from 1870 to 1897 was one of steadily declining prices.").
62 See C. VANN WOODWARD, TOM WATSON: AGRARIAN REBEL 129-31 (1938); see also
JAMES L. HUNT, MARION BUTLER AND AMERICAN POPULISM 23 (2003) (stating that
merchants commonly charged an interest rate of fifty percent in rural areas).
63 SeeJAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PART'Y SY~'STM 108-09 (1983); see also
HOFSTADTER, supra note 10, at 58 (stating that farmers faced a "high cost of credit,"
"discriminatory railroad rates," and "unreasonable elevator and storage charges").
64 SeeJames Baird Weaver, The Threefold Contention of Industry, in FARMER DISCON-
TENT 1865-1900, at 80, 87 (Vernon Rosco Carstensen ed., 1974); see also IRVING, supra
note 56, at 33 ("We have over us the money king, the iron king, the coal king, the
cattle king, the pork king, the wheat king, the corn king, the lumber king, the rail-
road magnate, the telegraph monopolist, and the coffin despot.").
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bands of Militia to do their fighting .... At the word of command
these hireling assassins shoot down men, women and children....
Not only do the Corporations keep armed Retainers: they keep
oily and servile Courtiers to do their bidding in other walks of life.
Their paid Lobby bribes the voter. Their paid editor feeds the pub-
lic with lies. Their corrupt Lawyers and Judges peddle out justice to
the highest bidder. Their Attorneys go on the Bench or into Sen-
ates to vote the will of their Masters.
65
The omnipresent corporate power that Watson described was espe-
cially galling because farmers adhered to the Jeffersonian view that
they were the backbone of the republic and that freedom could not
long endure in a commercial world.
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Driven by these economic and social concerns, agrarian interests
made efforts to organize through the Granger Movement and the
Greenback Party, but these attempts came to naught until the forma-
tion of the Farmers' Alliance in the 1880s.67 Initially, this umbrella
organization, which was the antecedent of the Populist Party, avoided
politics and stressed the need for rural folk to join together as a way of
enhancing their leverage with creditors. 68 That appeal for collective
action struck a chord, as more than three million people flocked to
the reform banner.69 One sympathetic newspaper said that "'[t]he
people are aroused at last. Never in our history has there been such a
union of action among farmers as now.' ",70 In spite of this impressive
result, Alliance leaders quickly realized that self-help would not be
enough to address the problem. They needed to enter the political
arena and bring the full power of government to bear.
71
65 THOMAS E. WATSON, THE PEOPLE'S PARTY CAMPAIGN BOOK 1892, at 206-07
(Arno Press 1975) (1892). The tragic story of Watson's descent from reformer to
racist reactionary, which is a metaphor for the Populist movement as a whole, is told
by WOODWARD, supra note 62.
66 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 10, at 28-30; HUNT, supra note 62, at 22; William
Jennings Bryan, The Cross of Gold Speech, in GREAT SPEECHES, supra note 30, at 768, 771
("[T] he great cities rest upon our broad and fertile prairies. Bum down your cities
and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our
farms, and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country.").
67 See HicKs, supra note 10, at 27-28, 96-97; JONES, supra note 14, at 74.
68 See GOODWYN, supra note 10, at 27; see also BRANDS, supra note 10, at 184
("While farmers watched the corporations with which they did business get larger and
more consolidated, they increasingly felt the need to consolidate in self-defense.").
69 See HicKs, supra note 10, at 103; WOODWARD, supra note 62, at 136.
70 BRANDS, supra note 10, at 184 (quoting the Chicago Western Rural).
71 See St. Louis Demands (Dec. 1889) [hereinafter St. Louis Demands], in Hics,
supra note 10, app. A, at 427, 427-30; see also HurNTr, supra note 62, at 30 (calling this
the Alliance's "first platform expressing a unitary set of national political demands").
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To see why agrarian activists made the expansion of federal au-
thority a central pillar of their ideology, let us begin by examining the
issue that is most closely associated with the movement: currency re-
form and the free coinage of silver.72 Most farmers rejected the argu-
ment that deflation in commodity prices was the result of technology.
Instead, they blamed a restrictive monetary policy based on the gold
standard. 73 That was the basis for Bryan's famous vow that "you shall
not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold,"74 which Senator William
Allen of Nebraska explained as "'the operation of a shrinking volume
of money... [by which] the East has placed its hands on the throat of
the West.'"75 When the Farmers' Alliance held its first national con-
gress in 1889, the platform called for the issuance of legal tender "in
sufficient volume to do the business of the country on a cash system"
and "the free and unlimited coinage of silver." 76 So while both planks
sought to reverse the fall in agricultural prices, they were also ac-
knowledging that only federal action could address the farmers'
plight.
7 7
This new enthusiasm for public intervention and collective action
was on full display in the Alliance's position that the best way to deal
with the railroads and other industries was for the government to own
them. 78 The most popular novel of the time, Looking Backward, was set
in the year 2000 and described a utopia based on nationalizing the
72 The Populist passion for silver shines at other points in this Article, but the
best example is Coin's Financial School, a fictional account of a teenager who debates
the issue with the financial titans of Chicago. See WILLIAM H. HARVEY, COIN'S FINAN-
CIAL SCHOOL (Richard Hofstadter ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1894). This book,
which is after all about a pretty dry topic, became a sensation. See JONES, supra note
14, at 32-33; see also KOENIG, supra note 60, at 158 ("Seldom, if ever, has a publication
educated so vast a public on a serious political issue.").
73 See HICKS, supra note 10, at 87-91. It is fair to say that price declines were
caused by a combination of the gold standard and technology, though that does not
mean that aggressive inflation was the best solution.
74 Bryan, supra note 66, at 772. It is interesting to note that my students know
Bryan only for his role in the Scopes Trial, which can be seen as a metaphor for the
shift in our politics from economic to cultural issues.
75 HIcKs, supra note 10, at 90.
76 St. Louis Demands, supra note 71, at 427-28.
77 This did not increase the scope of federal power, since Congress had estab-
lished the gold standard in 1873. See GOODWYN, supra note 10, at 16. The back-
ground of the currency issue is laid out in BRANDS, supra note 10, at 199-201.
78 See St. Louis Demands, supra note 71, at 428 ("We demand that the means of
communication and transportation shall be owned by and operated in the interest of
the people as is the United States postal system.").
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means of production. 79 Though this gave the federal establishment a
greater role than was ever contemplated before or since, reformers
contended "'[w] here a business is so clearly of a public nature that
the individual can only get fair treatment by having the government to
act for all, then individualism ceases to be wise and nationalism be-
comes . . . necessary." 80 The scope of this concept was never fully
explored, but the Populists would call for a takeover of railroads, the
telegraph, the telephone network, and banks.
81
Driven by the unprecedented hardships facing farmers, these
proposals reflected a broader judgment that in the industrial age gov-
ernment should secure positive rights and redistribute income. 82 Ig-
natius Donnelly, a leading drafter of the Populist platform, dismissed
the idea that freedom consisted only of a lack of restraints imposed by
the state.83 He wondered "' [w] hat is freedom worth to a man who is
dying of hunger?... Can you keep a room warm, next winter, with the
thermometer at 30' below zero, by reciting the Declaration of Inde-
pendence?"' 84 Spurred on by this belief in affirmative liberty, the Alli-
ance made a progressive income tax a central goal and demanded the
phase-out of corporate subsidies in favor of the poor to prevent the
"governmental injustice [that] breed [s] the two great classes-tramps
and millionaires."85 With all of these reforms, the Populists vowed "to
restore the government of the Republic to the hands of 'the plain
people,' with whose class it originated."
86
79 See EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD, 2000-1887 (Am. Reprint Co. 1987)
(1887); see also Fiss, supra note 19, at 38 (stating that Looking Backward sold more
copies than any other nineteenth-century book except Ben-Hur and Uncle Tom's
Cabin).
80 WOODWARD, supra note 62, at 260 (quoting Tom Watson's article on "The Rail-
road Question").
81 See The Omaha Platform (July 1892) [hereinafter 1892 Populist Platform], in
HIcKS, supra note 10, app. F, at 439, 443; see also T.C. JoRY, WHAT Is POPULISM?: AN
EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE OMAHA PLATFORM ADOPTED BY THE PEOPLE'S
PARTY IN NATIONAL CONVENTION ASSEMBLED 9 (Salem, Ross E. Moores & Co. 1895)
("[E]very citizen of the United States who wishes to do so shall have an opportunity to
go to work directly for his government. .. ").
82 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 37-40; see also HOFSTADTER, supra note 10, at 61
("Populism was the first modern political movement of practical importance in the
United States to insist that the federal government has some responsibility for the
common weal .... ").
83 See GooDwYN, supra note 10, at 105-06; WOODWARD, supra note 62, at 202.
84 MARTIN RIDGE, IGNATIUS DONNELLY: THE PORTRAIT OF A POLITICIAN 324 (1962).
85 1892 Populist Platform, supra note 81, at 440; see St. Louis Demands, supra
note 71, at 428-29.
86 1892 Populist Platform, supra note 81, at 441.
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While this was a powerful agenda, in retrospect the major weak-
ness of the agrarian movement was its failure to present a compelling
message to labor.8 7 Just as the Gilded Age brought dislocation to ru-
ral households, industrialization also triggered turmoil in cities where
people struggled to earn a living wage. Faced with the power of trusts,
workers followed the logic of the times and embraced collective action
through unions. In an era where labor law did not exist and firms
refused to recognize the right of workers to organize, violent conflict
between labor and capital was not uncommon.88 For instance, in
1886 alone there were nearly 1400 strikes across the nation involving
500,000 employees. 89 That same year brought the Haymarket Riot, in
which anarchists set off a bomb in the center of Chicago in the midst
of clashes between strikers and the police. 90 Thus, addressing work-
ing conditions had the potential to draw new support to a reform coa-
lition. While the Alliance tried to formulate appealing urban policies,
they had little interest in or cultural affinity with factory workers, par-
ticularly since farmers saw city folk as the problem rather than as part
of the solution. 9 1
87 Another problem was that the Alliance offered nothing to the growing popula-
tion of recent immigrants. In a sense, the Populist movement was the last hurrah of
the white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant population that formed the backbone of the
movements led by Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln. By the 1890s, though, that group
was no longer a majority and could not win without allies. Nevertheless, the Party
rejected opening "our ports to the pauper and criminal classes of the world... and
demand[ed] the further restriction of undesirable immigration." 1892 Populist Plat-
form, supra note 81, at 444; seeJoRY, supra note 81, at 17. Even Tom Watson, for all of
his reforming zeal in these years, said "'[t]he scum of creation has been dumped on
us. Some of our principal cities are more foreign than American.... The vice and
crime which they have planted in our midst are sickening and terrifying.'" HoF-
STADTER, supra note 10, at 82.
88 For a particularly chilling account of the Homestead Strike of 1892, see
BRANDS, supra note 10, at 129-44 (describing the deaths that resulted from skirmishes
between strikers and Pinkerton detectives).
89 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 57.
90 See DAVID RAY PAPaKE, THE PULLMAN CASE 16 (1999); see alsoJEAN STROUSE, MOR-
CAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 256 (1999) ("The Haymarket affair sharply divided the
country."). For a discussion on the role Governor Altgeld of Illinois played in pardon-
ing the Haymarket Rioters and supporting the Pullman Strike, see infra notes 152-54,
161-63 and accompanying text.
91 Compare St. Louis Demands, supra note 71, at 430 ("We sympathize with the
just demands of labor of every grade and recognize that many of the evils from which
the farming community .Nd, ,FF, uss universal laboi ... ."), with HOFSTADTER, supra
note 10, at 62 ("According to the agrarian myth, the health of the state was propor-
tionate to the degree to which it was dominated by the agricultural class . . ").
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Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Alliance and other like-
minded groups formed the People's Party in 1891.92 A modern
reader may think it odd that reformers would form a new party rather
than capture control of one of the existing parties, but the example
fresh in their minds was the movement led by the new Republican
Party in the 1850s. Indeed, Populist activists often invoked the strug-
gle against slavery, as one did by paraphrasing Dred Scott's infamous
declaration on the status of African Americans: "The oppressed of to-
day are white laborers and mechanics who, evidently, though without
a Supreme Court decision, have no rights which millionaires and
moneyed corporations are bound to respect. '93 In 1892, the Populists
nominated James B. Weaver as their standard bearer in the presiden-
tial election. 94 Weaver's innovative constitutional views are the focus
of the next Part.
B. Populism and the Commerce Clause
The history of the agrarian revolt is well known, but the creativity
of Populist lawyers gets little recognition. Given the Party's ambitious
agenda, its leaders needed new ideas to sustain these actions in the
courts. On some issues, such as replacing the gold standard or imple-
menting an income tax, precedent supported (or so it seemed) the
power of Congress to act.95 For other proposals, especially the goal of
nationalizing industries, the Party tried to develop a new source of
constitutional power from existing textual provisions. The solution of
people like Weaver and Marion Butler, the Populist leader in North
Carolina, was to turn the Commerce Clause into a strong tool for fed-
92 See HUNT, supra note 62, at 38; see also KOENIG, supra note 60, at 83 (calling this
a "political miracle"). In the 1890 election, pro-Alliance candidates were elected to
state and congressional offices, but this narrative skips over that to concentrate on the
campaigns following the creation of the Populist Party.
93 WILLIAM H. CARWARDINE, THE PULLMAN STRIKE 121 (Charles H. Kerr & Co.
1971) (1894); see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (stating
that the Framers believed African Americans "had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect"); see also WEAVER, supra note 12, at 133 ("We distinctly remember
that the same Court and Dred Scott once differed in their conceptions of human
rights under our Constitution. But Dred Scott's views are now generally accepted. It
is probable that the controversy between the farmers and the Court will end in the
same way.").
94 See SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 136; WOODWARD, supra note 62, at 230.
95 SeeJuilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 450 (1884) (holding that the creation
of legal tender was a political question committed to the sole discretion of Congress);
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) (upholding a federal income tax).
With respect to the income tax, however, that assumption was misplaced. See infra
notes 271-98 and accompanying text.
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eral action.96 Yet the fog of time obscures how innovative this was and
diminishes what became the most lasting legal contribution of that
era.
Weaver framed his 1892 campaign with a book entitled A Call to
Action and several articles that laid out the Populist platform and
presented an analysis of how prevailing case law impinged on the
goals of reformers.97 Starting as Lincoln did with the Declaration of
Independence, Weaver asked if it could "be denied that all men have
a natural right to a portion of the soil" as part of their inalienable
rights.98 His conclusion was that this was "as sacred as their right to
life itself" and that "[t]hese propositions are so manifestly true as to
lie beyond the domain of controversy."99 The problem in Weaver's
view was that these rights could not be exercised without access to
credit and transportation since "they are the instrumentalities
through which the natural rights of man are rendered available in
organized society." 00 He was therefore troubled by a set of recent
holdings that the Dormant Commerce Clause barred the states from
regulating some goods and services that crossed over their border.l0 1
Weaver's deeper concern, which was shared by other rural lawyers,
was that the Justices were laying the predicate for a reversal of the
Granger Cases of the 1870s, in which the Court rejected a constitu-
tional attack on state laws limiting storage prices and shipping rates
and affirmed that states were generally free to regulate business. 0 2
96 See Hurr, supra note 62, at 42; see also WEAVER, supra note 12, at 5 ("The sover-
eign right to regulate commerce among our magnificent union of States, and to con-
trol the instruments of commerce . . . have been leased to associated speculators.").
97 See WEAVER, supra note 12, at 94-135; Weaver, supra note 64, at 83-87.
98 See Weaver, supra note 64, at 82; see also PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 202-06 (1997) (recounting Lincoln's use
of the Declaration in his arguments against slavery).
99 Weaver, supra note 64, at 82; seeJoRY, supra note 81, at 15 (stating that a "man's
right to life involves his right to occupy a place to live on. Some place to live on is a
necessary condition to life itself").
100 Weaver, supra note 64, at 84.
101 See Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 498-500 (1888) (striking
down state laws barring the importation of liquor without a license); Wabash, St.
Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886) (holding that the regulation
of interstate railroad rates could only "be done by the Congress of the United States
under the commerce clause of the Constitution"); WEAVER, supra note 12, at 111-25
(arguing that these cases were inconsistent with the precedents governing the police
power of the states when Congress did not act).
102 See Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 183 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (rejecting
the reasoning of the Granger Cases); Peik v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164, 177-78
(1877) (rejecting a Dormant Commerce Clause attack on railroad rate regulation);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130-35 (1877) (rejecting other challenges to these state
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Weaver responded that the present state of affairs was inconsis-
tent with first principles because the Framers recognized that the nat-
ural right to the soil was "practically inseparable" from the control of
credit and transportation.103 He said that this was why "they incorpo-
rated the [Commerce Clause] among other far-reaching and sweep-
ing provisions" in the Constitution.1 0 4 And "[w]hatever may be the
meaning of this provision, it is certain that the framers . . . regarded
the power to be exercised as too important to be confided to the dis-
cretion of individuals or left to the control of the States." 10 5 Likewise,
Marion Butler said that the Commerce Clause should be read more
expansively due to "the greatest social, industrial and political evolu-
tion the world has ever seen." 10 6 In Weaver's eyes, Congress was ig-
noring its obligations by delegating its commerce power to the trusts
and allowing them to "crush out the inalienable rights of the peo-
ple."1 0 7 Thus, he said that "the great object of the Industrial move-
ment now challenging public attention, is to restore to Congress its
Constitutional and exclusive control over the great limbs of com-
merce, money, transportation and telegraphy."' 08
This reasoning was groundbreaking at the time because nobody
else saw the Commerce Clause as such a far-reaching and sweeping
provision. Virtually all lawyers learn that the clause was first inter-
preted by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.109 It is also well
known that the Court paid little attention to the reach of the com-
merce power until the annus mirabilis of 1895.110 In fact, none of the
statutes);JoR', supra note 81, at 26 (lamenting that "[t]hese decisions have been prac-
tically annulled"); RIDGE, supra note 84, at 297 (describing Ignatius Donnelly's fear
that the Granger Cases would be overruled); WEAVER, supra note 12, at 84-85 (stating
that it "was the purpose in certain circles to overthrow ... the Grange decisions of
1876"). Ironically, that fear would be realized because of the Populist failure. See
infra notes 361-64 and accompanying text.
103 See HuNT, supra note 62, at 42; Weaver, supra note 64, at 84.
104 Weaver, supra note 64, at 84. Weaver then went on to quote the Commerce
Clause in full. Id.
105 Id.; seeWEAVER, supra note 12, at 410 ("The power which the people originally
possessed to regulate commerce among the States for themselves was by the adoption
of the Constitution, solemnly transferred to Congress and... [t]he Congress can not
escape the responsibility if it would.").
106 HuNT, supra note 62, at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Weaver, supra note 64, at 85-86; seeWEAVER, supra note 12, at 265-66 (compar-
ing Congress's actions to granting letters of marque to privateers).
108 WEAVER, supra note 12, at 436.
109 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
110 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1995) (stating that until the
late nineteenth century "the Court's Commerce Clause decisions dealt but rarely with
the extent of Congress's power"); infra Part IV.A-B.
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great nineteenth-century decisions on congressional authority-Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,"' Dred. Scott,112 the Legal Tender Cases,'1 3 the
Trade-Mark Cases,1 14 or the Civil Rights Cases' 15-were about the Com-
merce Clause.1 16 To the extent that broad assertions of national
power were made, the Court relied either on other textual provisions
or on a generalized claim that Congress could act.
Though the Commerce Clause began to assume its modern form
with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887
and the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, the discussion
was still rather cautious.'a 7 The creation of the Commission to regu-
late railroad rates was only a response to a Supreme Court opinion in
the prior year holding that such an act could only be undertaken by
Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause."1 8 When Senator Sher-
man introduced his bill to regulate the trusts, he denied that the com-
merce power was applicable." 9 His idea was to break up monopolies
by imposing punitive taxes on them under what he saw as the more
robust taxing power.' 20 Though Congress concluded that the Com-
merce Clause could support the Sherman Act, even at this late date
considerable doubts remained about the breadth of that provision.
This shows how revolutionary Weaver's position was.
111 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
112 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
113 SeeJuilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457 (1871); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
114 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
115 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
116 In the Trade-Mark Cases, counsel did suggest that the Commerce Clause could
sustain a federal law regulating marks, but the Court declined to address the issue
because Congress did not consider that option. See 100 U.S. at 94-98. Likewise, the
Civil Rights Cases said the question of whether Congress could bar private racial dis-
crimination under the commerce power was not presented. See 109 U.S. at 19.
117 See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); Interstate Commerce
Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554
(1995) ("These laws ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce
power.").
118 See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886) (hold-
ing that regulating interstate railroad rates could only "be done by the Congress of
the United States under the commerce clause of the Constitution").
119 See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAw AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 88 (1965) (describing Sherman's view that "the only
constitutional provision enabling Congress to legislate against trusts was the power to
levy taxes").
120 See id. This was the solution favored by Weaver, who was skeptical that the
Sherman Act would work. See WEAVER, supra note 12, at 393-94.
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A great unanswered question in constitutional law is why the
Commerce Clause became the principal source of federal authority in
the modern era. One explanation is that the sweeping language in
Gibbons was rediscovered in the 1890s after being ignored for de-
cades. 121 Even if that view is correct, however, that would not explain
why the epiphany occurred when it did. The real answer to the riddle
is that the Populist Party made the Commerce Clause a centerpiece of
its constitutional philosophy and thereby catapulted that concept into
the legal mainstream. Weaver's emphasis on the commerce power is
telling in this respect, and more evidence can be found in the debate
on the Sherman Act. It turns out that the Farmers' Alliance was a
leading force behind the Act, and the Senate spent time trying to
shape its commerce theory to exempt the Alliance from antitrust lia-
bility.122 In other words, there was a nexus between the expansion of
the Commerce Clause and the agrarian reformers who were carrying a
new reading of that text into the courts. This would force the Court
to articulate a new commerce theory, though its position would be far
different from James B. Weaver's.
Backed by this new and exciting Populist message, Weaver re-
ceived more than a million votes and carried five states in the 1892
election. 12 3 The down-ticket results were even more encouraging, as
Populist governors won in three states and scores of other party mem-
bers or allies were swept into office. 124 While the actual winners of the
presidential and congressional elections were Grover Cleveland and
the Democrats, there was a feeling at the time that the Populists were
poised to enter the pantheon of successful constitutional move-
ments. 125 As one contemporary pamphleteer stated, "[A] party which
121 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824) ("Commerce,
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.").
122 See 21 CONG. REC. 2562, 2562 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); LETWIN,
supra note 119, at 89; see also Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundations ofNoerr-Pennington
and the Burden of Proving Sham Petitioning: The Historical-Constitutional Argument in Favor
of a "Clear and Convincing" Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 681, 697-99 (1994) (stating that
Senator Sherman was well aware of Alliance lobbying efforts on behalf of the Inter-
state Commerce Act and antitrust legislation).
123 See SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 136-37. Weaver carried Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Nevada, and North Dakota. See HicKs, supra note 10, at 263 (displaying a map
with the distribution of the Populist vote).
124 See HicKs, supra note 10, at 267; see alsoJONES, supra note 14, at 77 ("The first
Populist successes in the West in 1891 and 1892 were spectacular for a political move-
ment so recently established.").
125 SeejONES, supra note 14, at 36; see also SKOWRONEK, supra note 15, at 48 ("Cleve-
land rode to victory in 1892 on the heels of a potentially significant electoral shift.").
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comes into existence in the summer and polls considerably over a mil-
lion votes in the fall cannot be ignored much longer."
'126
III. PRESIDENTIAL RESISTANCE AND THE PULLMAN STRIKE
This Part traces the opposition to Populism from the White
House and shows the process of mutual transformation in action.
Prior to the 1892 election, conservatives did not seem all that con-
cerned about the prospect of an agrarian takeover. That all changed,
however, with the onset of the Panic of 1893, which was the worst
economic disaster this country faced until the Great Depression.1 27 As
unemployment skyrocketed to about thirty percent, the nation en-
tered "the annge terrible of American history between Reconstruction
and the [First] World War." 128 In this charged atmosphere, President
Cleveland chose a strategy of massive resistance to reform, and this led
the parties to increase their demands and reconsider first principles
with respect to federalism.
A. Grover Cleveland and the Transformation of Federalism
This part of the story begins by examining the pivotal role that
Grover Cleveland played in shaping the dynamic that culminated in
the Populist false positive. I 29 On the heels of his 1892 victory, the
Panic gave the President a rare opportunity to expand his coalition.
By embracing some Populist proposals and offering relief to dispos-
sessed farmers and workers, he could have neutered the new third-
party while putting Republicans in the difficult position of opposing
these emergency measures. Indeed, Franklin D. Roosevelt would use
a similar strategy to build the New Deal majority. Cleveland was a
skilled politician capable of pulling this off-he was, after all, the only
Democrat to capture the Presidency between 1860 and 1912. The
problem was that he represented the faction of the party that sup-
ported the gold standard and opposed government intervention in
126 IRVING, supra note 56, at 37.
127 See JONES, supra note 14, at 3; see also HERBERT CROLY, MARCUS ALONZO HANNA:
His LIFE AND WORK 210 (1912) ("IT]he business depression, coincident with Mr.
Cleveland's second administration, stirred the American people more deeply and had
graver political consequences than had any previous economic famine.").
128 ALLAN NEVINS, GROVER CLEVELAND: A STUDY IN COURAGE 649 (1932); see Fiss,
supra note 19, at 39 (noting that unemployment in manufacturing may have reached
fifty percent).
129 See SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 144 ("The variable of leadership seems singu-
larly important in the realignment of the 1890s. To be sure, Cleveland was at once a
cause and a result.").
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the economy. 130 Thus, Cleveland faced a moment of truth that con-
servatives in every era confront: should he limit the damage to his
principles by joining the popular uprising or stand fast and risk an
even greater defeat?
131
The President was in a fighting mood. Rather than compromis-
ing with the Populists, he decided that the Panic could only be ad-
dressed through more conservative policies. Cleveland blamed the
meltdown on an 1890 statute that ordered the Treasury to buy a lim-
ited amount of silver and issue notes against those purchases to pla-
cate the demand for unlimited silver coinage.13 2 Claiming that this
policy undermined confidence in the banking system, the President
summoned a special session of Congress and rammed through a re-
peal of the law. 133 Thereafter, Cleveland maintained a strict gold stan-
dard, and when the Treasury's reserves dropped he even called upon
J.P. Morgan to form a syndicate that would sell bonds to wealthy inves-
tors in order to raise more gold.
34
These actions marked the first escalation in the standoff between
the Populists and the establishment. While Marion Butler lambasted
the President as a "tool of corporate interest, a traitor, and a drunk-
ard," other reformers took a more sanguine view.' 35 Tom Watson de-
clared that the return to a pure gold standard was "'a God-send to
us"' because it would bring conservative attitudes "'[i]nto the clear
light, where all honest citizens can see."''i 6 He predicted that this
would lead to greater polarization that could only redound to the ben-
efit of the Populist Party, as "'Democrats who hold Republican doc-
130 See id. at 142; see also Grover Cleveland, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1893), in 9
MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 389, 390 ("[W]hile people should patriotically and cheer-
fully support their Government[,] its functions do not include the support of the
people.").
131 See supra Part I.A.
132 The Act required the Treasury to purchase silver with notes that could be re-
deemed in gold or silver. See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 83; STROUSE, supra note 90, at
305.
133 See HUNT, supra note 62, at 61; see also Grover Cleveland, Special Session Mes-
sage (Aug. 8, 1893), in 9 MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 401, 402-03 (outlining the Presi-
dent's opposition to the Silver Purchase Act).
134 See STROUSE, supra note 90, at 341-49; see also Grover Cleveland, Annual Mes-
sage (Dec. 2, 1895), in 9 MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 626, 644 ("With a reserve peril-
ously low and a refusal of Congressional aid, everything indicated that the end of gold
payments by the Government was imminent .... An agreement [to sell bonds] was
therefore made with a number of financiers and bankers . ").
135 HUNT, supra note 62, at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136 WOOOWARD, supra note 62, at 252-53; cf STROUSE, supra note 90, at 350 ("No




trines will be driven to the Republican Party, and vice versa. Members
of the two old parties who really hold Populist views, finding no sup-
port in either Democratic or Republican ranks, will be driven to the
People's Party.'" 13 7 Watson's comments state the essence of a mutual
transformation in the law. 138 By taking stern action to snuff out the
constitutional movement, Cleveland risked provoking an even greater
reaction from reformers that would intensify their support and
demands.
The Populists and their allies responded by seeing the President's
bet and raising it with a campaign of protests and civil disobedience.
In the spring of 1894, a Populist activist from Ohio, Jacob Coxey, led a
march of unemployed workers to demand action on a vast public jobs
program. 139 As his supporters converged on Washington, The New
York Times declared that this was a "'Battle between Law and Anar-
chy"' and officials rushed weapons and troops into the city. 14 0 When
the "petition in boots" reached the Capitol, Coxey's Army was wel-
comed by the police with beatings and arrests.1 4 1 Protests broke out
in other cities, and "'in no civilized country in this century, not actu-
ally in the throes of war or open insurrection, has society been so dis-
organized as it was in the United States during the first half of
1894.'"142
1. The Pullman Strike
Without a doubt, the most important clash between reformers
and the President came that summer during the Pullman Strike. This
violence was the backdrop for the Debs case and helped reshape atti-
tudes toward federalism. 143 In my view, the reaction to the strike is
one of the most underrated legal events of the nineteenth century.
Like the link between the rise of Populism and the Commerce Clause,
however, this development comes into focus only when the false posi-
tive model is introduced.
137 WOODWARD, supra note 62, at 253.
138 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
139 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 160-76; STROUSE, supra note 90, at 336-37.
140 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 171-73.
141 See RIDGE, supra note 84, at 329-30 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
BRANDS, supra note 10, at 174 ("The police responded by laying all about them with
billy clubs.").
142 STROUSE, supra note 90, at 336 (quoting ROBERT SOBEL, PANIC ON WALL STREET
260 (1968)).
143 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (upholding the injunction against the Pull-
man Strike); infra Part IV.B.
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The strike grew out of a dispute between Pullman, the main pro-
ducer of railroad cars, and the American Railway Union led by Eu-
gene V. Debs. Most of the firm's work occurred in a company town
near Chicago where workers paid rent to Pullman and bought sup-
plies from its stores. 144 Following the Panic, the company slashed
wages by more than twenty-five percent but refused to reduce rents
and prices for employees who had nowhere else to live. 145 When the
workers complained, their ringleaders were fired. 146 This led to a
strike that caught the attention of Debs, who called Pullman's interest
in its workers "'the same as the interest of a slave holder in his human
chattels.' "147 When Pullman rejected a suggestion that the strike be
resolved through arbitration, the umbrella union responded by call-
ing for a boycott of Pullman. 148 That transformed a local dispute into
a national crisis by bringing railroad traffic across the country to a
halt.149 Harper's Weekly stated that the nation was "fighting for its own
existence just as truly as in suppressing the great rebellion.' 5 °
This latest escalation of the constitutional confrontation created
a legal minefield for the President. The railroad barons were clamor-
ing for an end to this "attempt at blackmail" and wanted troops sent
into Chicago "'because that was the center and headquarters of the
strike and that, if smashed there, it would collapse everywhere else.' "151
One problem with that plan, though, was that the Governor of Illi-
nois, John Peter Altgeld, was sympathetic to the strikers and opposed
federal intervention. 152 Altgeld was a bogeyman for conservatives due
to his recent decision to grant clemency to the Haymarket Rioters.
15 3
Now he raised a large obstacle for Cleveland by claiming that the fed-
144 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 147; PAPKE, supra note 90, at 11-14.
145 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 147-48; PAPKE, supra note 90, at 17-18.
146 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 148; PAPrKE, supra note 90, at 18.
147 PAPKE, supra note 90, at 19; see BRANDS, supra note 10, at 148-49. Actually,
Debs was a moderate in contrast with his union brethren. See PAPiuE, supra note 90, at
27; see also BRANDS, supra note 10, at 149 (stating that Pullman's obstinacy undercut
Debs's restrained position).
148 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 149; PAPKaE, supra note 90, at 24-25.
149 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 150; see also Fiss, supra note 19, at 73 ("The Chi-
cago disturbance started as an ordinary strike but quickly took on extraordinary
dimensions. It created a mass disorder, paralyzing the national rail and postal systems
and threatening the very idea of an economic union.").
150 PAPE, supra note 90, at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 WOODWARD, supra note 62, at 261 (quoting Attorney General Olney); see
BRANDS, supra note 10, at 151.
152 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 65; see also BRANDS, supra note 10, at 153 (" [A]mong
business circles Altgeld possessed a reputation as a flaming radical .. . [who] consist-
ently took the side of labor in industrial quarrels ....").
153 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 153; Fiss, supra note 19, at 65.
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eral government had no power to enter a sovereign state and interfere
with its domestic affairs.' 54  Thus, a Democratic President was
presented with the argument that federalism, the Party's touchstone
for nearly a century, protected Debs and his cohorts. Cleveland now
faced a second hard choice that challenges all conservatives who are
in the throes of resistance. When their principles faithfully applied
would give their foes a victory, what should they do? 1
55
The President's Attorney General, Richard Olney, answered that
question by ignoring federalism and asserting that the Commerce
Clause gave President Cleveland the power to act. Of course, this
claim was most ironic since the Populists were relying on the com-
merce power to back their vision of a more egalitarian industrial sys-
tem.156 Olney argued that the strike was disrupting mail deliveries,
even though the unions had pledged to exempt mail from the work
stoppage. 157 Railroad owners, though, prevented the mail trains from
moving and gave the Attorney General the excuse he needed to ob-
tain an injunction ordering the union to cease its activities.'15  When
Debs refused to comply, the President ordered in the troops and is-
sued a decree stating that "[t]hose who disregard this warning and
persist in taking part with a riotous mob in forcibly resisting and ob-
structing the execution of the laws of the United States ... can not be
regarded otherwise than as public enemies."'159
As workers and soldiers fought bloody clashes in the city, Gover-
nor Altgeld telegrammed the President demanding an end to the in-
vasion. 160 The Governor explained his position this way:
154 See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. I do not deny that there was a
plausible case for federal action in the Pullman Strike, though the text shows that a
lot of work was required to develop a rationale. But see David Gray Adler, The Steel
Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155, 184-85 (2002)
(calling Cleveland's justification "altogether tinpersuasive").
156 See supra notes 104-22 and accompanying text. For a discussion on this emerg-
ing dialogue about the proper use of federal power, see infra Part III.A.2.
157 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1895); BRANDS, supra note 10, at 151; see
also PAPKE, supra note 90, at 30-31 (reviewing Olney's corporate background).
158 See Debs, 158 U.S. at 570-72; see also BRANDS, supra note 10, at 151 (observing
that railroad officials forcibly halted mail trains).
159 Proclamation No. 11 (July 8, 1894), 28 Stat. 1249 (1894), reprinted in 9
MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 499 ("[I]t has become impracticable in the judgment of
the President to enforce by the ordinary course ofjudicial proceedings, the laws of
the United States within the State of Illinois, and especially in the city of Chi-
cago . . . ."); see also BRANDS, supra note 10, at 152 (laying out the timeline).
160 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 154-55; see also PAPKE, supra note 90, at 33 (stat-
ing that eleven were killed and fifty wounded).
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I submit that local self government is a fundamental principle of
our constitution .... Especially is this so in matters relating to the
exercise of the police power and the preservation of law and order.
To absolutely ignore a local government in matters of this kind,...
not only insults the people of this state..., but is in violation of a
basic principle of our institutions.
16 1
Consistent with this principled defense of federalism, Altgeld denied
that the federal government had the authority to send troops into Illi-
nois unless he requested assistance. 162 In making this claim, he ar-
gued that "'[t]he question of federal supremacy is in no way
involved; . . . under our constitution federal supremacy and local self
government must go hand in hand and to ignore the latter is to do
violence to the constitution.'
163
The President answered Altgeld's protest with a telegram outlin-
ing his constitutional prerogatives. He began by observing that there
was a request for assistance by "'the post office department that ob-
structions of the mails should be removed,"' and hence "'[f]ederal
troops were sent to Chicago in strict accordance with the constitutions
and laws of the United States.'- 164 In a terse summary of his analysis,
Cleveland said that his decision was based "'upon abundant proof that
conspiracies existed against commerce between the states."' 16 5 This
position was backed by voices in the press who called the Governor a
"sympathizer with riot, with violence, with lawlessness and with anar-
chy."166 While critics said that "from the White House down it has
been determined to put forth every effort even to Gattling guns,.., to
destroy this strike and the laboring people," in the end the strike did
crumble under military pressure and a judicial injunction.
167
161 W.F. BURNs, THE PULLMAN Boyco-rr 63 (St. Paul, McGill Printing Co. 1894)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
162 See id. at 64 (stating that until he asked for federal help, "'I protest with all due
deference against this uncalled for reflection upon our people and again ask [for] the
immediate withdrawal of the troops"').
163 Id.
164 Id. at 64-65.
165 Id. at 65.
166 BRANDS, supra note 10, at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted); see MAT-
THEWJOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS 1865-1896, at 587 (1938) ("'The respectable press
of the country is a unit in applauding and sustaining the President.'" (quoting The
Week, The NATION (New York), July 12, 1894, at 19)).
167 BURNS, supra note 161, at 45; see PAPKE, supra note 90, at 38.
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2. A New Paradigm
Though the legality of Cleveland's actions would be tested in the
High Court, it is worth pausing here to consider how the strike af-
fected the debate on federalism in the coming years. The first point
that leaps from the page is that both sides in this struggle were fo-
cused on the Commerce Clause. It was in 1894 that the modern un-
derstanding of the Clause as the wellspring of federal power was
established. While the Populists had introduced the idea that the
commerce power served this function, the President's resistance led to
the development of an equally revolutionary alternative of what the
Clause meant. 168 This emerging dialogue demonstrates the dynamic
quality of constitutional discourse as each camp sought to overthrow
the other though mutually escalating actions. At the core of the disa-
greement in the 1890s was the scope of the federal government's
proper role in regulating the national economy.
As the Cleveland-Altgeld correspondence indicates, the more
subtle feature of the Pullman Strike was its impact on the age-old de-
bate over states' rights. Contemporary observers were struck by the
fact, long since forgotten, that the fight between Altgeld and Cleve-
land was the most serious challenge to federal authority since the Civil
War. 169 For the Populists and William Jennings Bryan, state govern-
ments were now the only remaining bulwark "'against a threatened
military government of the railroads and their associate monopo-
lies."170 Indeed, Bryan's 1896 platform made a full-throated defense
of federalism on the strike issue:
We denounce arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in
local affairs as a violation of the Constitution of the United States
and a crime against free institutions, and we especially object to gov-
ernment by injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of op-
pression by which Federal judges, in contempt of the laws of the
168 The left-wing activist MatthewJosephson put it best: "By a shift in the interpre-
tation of our constitutional government, and by a most devious usage of laws recently
enacted to regulate interstate corporations, a Democratic President and his lieuten-
ants introduced truly 'revolutionary' doctrines .... " JOSEPHSON, supra note 166, at
586; see WOODWARD, supra note 62, at 261-62.
169 See REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN TExT-BOOK 138 (Washington, D.C., Hartman &
Cadick 1896) [hereinafter GOP TEXTBOOK]; see also DELMORE ELWELL, A WALL STREET
VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN ISSUES OF 1896, at 4 (1896) (discussing the "railroad strike riots
of 1894" and stating that "[t] here are still a few blue-coated veterans of the Civil War
who will . . . register a prayer for a revival of the spirit of 1860").
170 BuRNs, supra note 161, at 113 (quoting a letter sent by local activists to the
national chair of the Populist Party).
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States and rights of citizens, become at once legislators, judges, and
executioners .... 171
Besides denouncing Cleveland's actions for violating state sovereignty,
Bryan claimed that the President contravened the Guarantee Clause,
which secures "to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Gov-
ernment, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Ap-
plication of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."' 72 In Bryan's view,
that provision embodied the idea that local officials are "better quali-
fied than the President to judge of the necessity for federal
assistance."
' 173
Conservatives replied that this was an invitation to anarchy and
that robust federal action was necessary to protect property rights.
One Republican pamphlet commented that the Populists wanted to
take "us back to 1861, when governors were abetting rebellion ....
This country is not ripe for such another struggle, nor ready to ap-
prove the doctrine that the Federal Government cannot fight for its
own life in spite of all the mayors, governors, or sheriffs."'1 74 And sup-
porters of Cleveland pointed out that "[t] he great Chicago railroad
strike of 1894 was anything but a 'local affair.' It involved the railroad
employees of fifteen states and was, incidentally, the cause of violence
and rioting which almost amounted to open insurrection." 175 The At-
torney General went so far as to say that federalism was "'a far more
serious matter than the money question, or any of the other questions
now before the people, grave as they all are."' 176 If the Populists
would "'do nothing to protect the property ... of the United States
171 GOP TEXTBOOK, supra note 169, at 138. The story of how Bryan became the
standard bearer of the Populists and a newly reconstituted Democratic Party is told in
Part V. See infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
172 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see BRYAN, supra note 1, at 410 (quoting his letter
accepting the Democratic nomination); see also CAMPAIGN TExT-BOOK OF THE NA-
TIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 1.93 (Chicago & New York, Nat'l Democratic Comm.
1896) [hereinafter GOLD DEMOCRAT TEXTBOOK] (stating the Gold Democrats' view
and quoting a response to Bryan from Attorney General Harmon).
173 BRYAN, supra note 1, at 411; see GOLD DEMOCRAT TEXTBOOK, supra note 172, at
1.93.
174 GOP TEXTBOOK, supra note 169, at 138; see The Nation's Honor Must Be Preserved,
HARPER'S WKLY., Sept. 26, 1896, at 938 ("In 1861, some of the States undertook to
enforce the doctrine that the Federal government had not the power to prevent them
from leaving the Union .... To-day Mr. BRYAN is asserting that the Federal govern-
ment cannot enforce its laws or protect its property against the violence of mobs ex-
cept by the consent of the State .... ).
175 GOLD DEMOCRAT TEXTBOOK, supra note 172, at 1.91.
176 Id. at 1.93 (quoting Attorney General Harmon).
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unless and until the officers of another government request or con-
sent, then we really have no Federal Government."'
177
The rapt attention given to this episode altered the way people
thought about federalism by changing its focus from the protection of
civil liberties to the protection of property rights.1 78 In other words,
the leading narrative on states' rights is that national action is espe-
cially important to protect racial and cultural minorities from discrim-
ination by states. This was the lesson from the struggle against slavery
and segregation. The Framers of the Constitution, though, had an-
other model in mind. They saw the national government as the
greater danger to personal freedom and the states as a more danger-
ous threat to property interests. As a consequence, they applied the
Bill of Rights to only the federal government and inserted clauses into
the body of the text that expressly limited how states could regulate
property.1
79
The conservative backlash against the Pullman Strike reinforced
the older understanding of federalism and diminished the substance
of Reconstruction by presenting a clear example, in conservative eyes,
of a state acting as an enemy of property.180 Moreover, the Populists
and William Jennings Bryan promised that if they got into power
states would have broad latitude to act against corporate interests.
Just as the President needed a new Commerce Clause theory to rebut
the Populist view that it granted power to nationalize industry, he also
needed to reassess the relationship between state and federal author-
ity in response to the Pullman Strike. In that context, conservative
leaders were far more concerned about the present danger from the
states with respect to property than with distant tales about violations
of individual rights.
177 Id.
178 One demonstration of just how much attention the crisis received is that the
press used more visual images to cover the Pullman Strike than they did for any prior
event. See PAPKE, supra note 90, at 36 (noting that the famed artist Frederic Reming-
ton penned illustrations for a Chicago newspaper).
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 5 ("No State shall.., make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts. . . ."); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 8 (stating that no
state could pass any "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts"); see Barron v. Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states).
180 That is a central idea of this project, though its relevance will be clearer in the
article discussing incorporation. See supra note 9. The Pullman Strike was a leading
event that drove the Court away from applying the Bill of Rights to the states and
toward an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that stressed the protection
of property fights. See infra Part VI.A.
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B. The Political Fallout from Cleveland's Resistance
These events were a dazzling backdrop for the 1894 midterm
elections, as Cleveland's opposition to the Populists split the Demo-
crats and created the chance for a new political alignment.1 8 1 As Tom
Watson had predicted, the President's escalation sparked an even
stronger reaction from reformers that was straining the established
party system.' 82 An officer involved in the Pullman crackdown re-
flected the polarization of the age by declaring that "'[m]en must
take sides ... either for anarchy, secret enclaves, unwritten law, mob
violence, and universal chaos under the red or white flag of socialism
on the one hand; or on the side of established government.' ,,183 The
Populists responded by taunting Cleveland for "bunco [ing] the coun-
try in a huge confidence game," and embraced the tumult with the
radical mantra that "to make an omelet, you must break some
eggs. 1 8 4 As one scholar said, "Populists had reason to forecast that
the Democratic party, caught in the middle as the country polarized,
would be pulled apart-just as the Whigs had been split by another
polarization forty years before-and the country would be left with
two parties, Populists and Republicans."'
8 5
A vivid example of the fear in Democratic ranks about the Presi-
dent's course of action can be found in a letter from the Party's lead-
ership in Georgia imploring Cleveland to cease his resistance or face
disaster. These experienced politicians told the President that "'[t] he
conditions of this State are fearful and threatening"' and fretted
about "'the long-continued delay in helpful legislation by Con-
gress." 1 8 6 As a result of his refusal to compromise, Georgia Demo-
crats were "'rapidly losing strength in this State. Every election held
in the State for the past three (3) months has gone against the Demo-
181 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 15, at 49 (explaining that Cleveland's actions were
devastating to the party). This decision was not so surprising because it was Cleve-
land's conservatism that enabled him to get elected as a Democrat in a Republican
time. Moreover, his career was built on a reputation for public moral rectitude and
distaste for compromise that made it difficult for him to switch positions in a credible
way. See id. at 460-61; SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 127.
182 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see also WOODWARD, supra note
62, at 264 ("'One year ago this country was being fed on the ambrosia of Democratic
expectations. Today it is gnawing the cobs of Democratic reality."' (quoting Tom
Watson)).
183 PAPKE, supra note 90, at 32.
184 WOODWARD, supra note 62, at 262; see RIDGE, supa note 84, at 334.
185 SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 149.
186 ALEX MATHEWS ARNE'T, THE POPULIST MOMENT IN GEORGIA 168-70 (1922)
(quoting Letter from William J. Northen, Governor of Georgia, to Grover Cleveland,
President of the United States (Sept. 15, 1893)).
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cratic party and in favor of the Populists.'"187 This letter concluded
with a warning that "'[e]x-Congressman Watson, the leader of the
Populists, has taken advantage of the conditions, and is speaking over
the State to assemblies never less than 2,000, and sometimes as many
as 5,000 people."' 1 88 Not surprisingly, the President was unmoved by
this appeal, responding that he "'hardly [knew] how to reply to your
letter' since "'I am quite plainly on record concerning the financial
question.' "189
Both sides emerged from the midterm election with renewed
hope that they would ultimately be vindicated. The Populists were
pleased because they increased their overall vote share from 1892.190
On the other hand, the main beneficiaries of the disarray in the Dem-
ocratic Party were the Republicans, who have been absent from the
story so far but now swept into control of the House of Representa-
tives. 191 Thus, Cleveland's resistance did not dowse the flames of Pop-
ulism. Instead, he polarized the country and caused each camp to
ratchet up its demands. One conservative author suggested a way out
of the deadlock by asking "[w] hat shall minister to a mind diseased
like the Populist's? Only constitutional remedies."192 The Court was
about to put its fist on the scale.
IV. THE JUSTICES ENTER THE FRAY
This Part surveys the resistance of the Justices and shows how that
led to the creation of broad anti-Populist precedents that formed the
nucleus of this constitutional false positive. The progressive gadfly
Matthew Josephson once said that "by a series of fateful decisions in
1895, with which it intervened boldly in the controversies of the age,
the Supreme Court... assumed the commanding role in our Govern-
ment. It was a kind of legal 'revolution' or coup d'6tat."193 While this
187 Id. at 169.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 170; see id. at 170-71 (reprinting Letter from Grover Cleveland, Presi-
dent of the United States, to William J. Northen, Governor of Georgia).
190 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 10, at 100; JONES, supra note 14, at 29; see also
SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 149 (stating that the Party's national vote increased from
one million to 1.5 million).
191 See SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 149 (describing the massive Republican vic-
tory with a net gain of 117 House seats).
192 Frank Basil Tracy, Rise and Doom of the Populist Party, in FARMER DiscoNTENT
1865-1900, supra note 64, at 94, 96 (emphasis added).
193 JOSEPHSON, supra note 166, at 605. The fact that the cases analyzed in this Part
were decided in the same year is largely coincidental. As the Court did not have
certiorari jurisdiction at the time, the Justices could not control the timing of their
docket in the way they do now. See Fiss, supra note 19, at 112.
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statement was over the top, in two major opinions the Justices did
reject the Populist reading of the Commerce Clause.' 9 4 In its most
controversial ruling, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,195 the Court
struck down the federal income tax and said in no uncertain terms
that it was crafting doctrine in response to Populism.
196
A. E.C. Knight and the Diminution of the Sherman Act
While the constitutional debate was raging in the political
branches, the Supreme Court started its assault on reformers in a stat-
utory case. In United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,' 9 7 the Attorney General
filed suit against the sugar trust, which controlled ninety-eight percent
of national production. 1 98 He relied on the Sherman Act and argued
that the trust should be divested of some of its assets. This trust was
declared by Sherman himself as one of the two most outrageous mo-
nopolies of the time (the other was Pullman) because sugar was a ne-
cessity of life. 199 The issue before the Court was whether the trust fell
within the statutory language regulating combinations that restrained
"commerce among the several states." 20 0 And in a pattern that would
be familiar in the great cases of this era, the Court ruled against the
Populist stance over the dissent of John Marshall Harlan.
20 1
194 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (upholding the injunction against the Pull-
man Strike); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that the
Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to manufacturing).
195 The Pollock decision was rendered in two parts. See Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601
(1895); Pollock I, 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
196 This Part discusses Pollock last even though the opinions were handed down
before Debs. This organization keeps the Commerce Clause cases together and inte-
grates them with the preceding analysis that focused on that provision and on the
Pullman Strike.
197 156 U.S. 1.
198 See id. at 2-8; supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text. Clearly, the Cleve-
land administration was not against all efforts to regulate the economy. See infra note
256 and accompanying text (noting that Cleveland let an income tax become law,
though without his signature).
199 See CARWARDINE, supra note 93, at 63; see also E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 19
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (implying that sugar was "essential to the comfort of every
household in the land").
200 156 U.S. at 10-11 (stating that the other issues were irrelevant).
201 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (stating
that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind," which echoed the views of some Southern
Populists); Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 685 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
people "ought not to be subjected to the dominion of aggregated wealth"); cf. Max-
well v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 614 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[I]t would seem that
the protection of private property is of more consequence than the protection of the
life and liberty of the citizen.").
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E.C. Knight held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the trust
because sugar production was "manufacturing" and not commerce.
Chief Justice Fuller said that " [c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture,
and is not a part of it."202 While "the power to control the manufac-
ture of a given thing involves in a certain sense the control of its dispo-
sition . . . [and] may result in bringing the operation of commerce
into play, it does not control it, and affects it only incidentally and
indirectly."203 This distinction came from a Dormant Commerce
Clause opinion, Kidd v. Pearson,20 4 which held that state regulation
was not subject to preemption merely because the regulated items
were intended for export.20 5 The Court also expressed concern that
the line between federal authority and the states' police power would
be obliterated if a broad definition of commerce was accepted. 20 6
Beyond these formalities, the Court indicated that its views were
colored by the policy implications of the Government's position.
20 7
After giving only a perfunctory nod to Gibbons, the opinion quoted
Kidd's view that if commerce included manufacturing then "'Con-
gress would be invested... with the power to regulate, not only manu-
factures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic
fisheries, mining-in short, every branch of human industry.'"20 8 In
the Court's view, "' [a] ny movement toward the establishment of rules
of production in this vast country, with its many different climates and
opportunities, could only be at the sacrifice of the peculiar advantages
of a large part of the localities in it.'"209 That outcome "'would be
202 E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12.
203 Id.
204 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
205 See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13-16; Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20 ("No distinction is more
popular to the common mind, or more clearly expressed in economic and political
literature, than that between manufacture and commerce.").
206 See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13 ("It is vital that the independence of the com-
mercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation between them, however
sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized. .. ").
207 In this respect, E.C. Knight followed in a tradition established by the second
Legal Tender Case, whereby the scope of Congress's enumerated power is judged
through an explicit or implicit balancing test that weighs the federal interest against
the autonomy rights of the several states. See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553
(holding that the creation of paper money by Congress was a valid exercise of implied
power as a wartime exigency).
208 E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 14 (quoting Kidd, 128 U.S. at 21). Gibbons was cited
once for its definition of commerce. See id. at 12. The other reference came when
the Court distinguished Gibbons on the ground that there "the state laws, which were
held inoperative, were instances of direct interference with, or regulations of, inter-
state or international commerce." See id. at 15-16.
209 Id. at 15 (quoting Kidd, 128 U.S. at 21-22).
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about the widest possible departure from the declared object of the
[Commerce Clause].,',210
Viewed in context, this was a response to the Populist reading of
the Commerce Clause. Indeed, the discussion just quoted is a text-
book argument against nationalizing industry, though this reading of
the opinion requires a full understanding of the contemporary politi-
cal background. Since the Court drew no distinction between the
meaning of commerce in the Sherman Act and in the Constitution,
E.C. Knight suggested that there would be constitutional roadblocks to
public ownership at the federal level.211 Yet the opinion was a shot
across the bow; an overture for the intense resistance that was coming.
After all, the Court did not challenge the Populists' central goal of
nationalizing railroads, the telegraph, or the telephone system, which
were all still commerce under the new definition. 212 Likewise, reform-
ers were blas6 about the fate of the Sherman Act given their prefer-
ence for direct state control rather than regulation. 213 Thus, E.C.
Knight generated little comment in the press or in the political
arena.21
4
Though the Court's criticism of Populism was oblique, the trajec-
tory of the majority's thinking was not lost on Justice Harlan. His
analysis of the Commerce Clause focused on the language in Gibbons
that supported the power of Congress to act whenever commerce was
affected. 215 Refuting the Court's argument on the difference between
manufacturing and commerce, he said "it is equally true that when
manufacture ends, that which has been manufactured becomes a sub-
ject of commerce; that buying and selling succeed manufacture, come
into existence after the process of manufacture is completed, precede
transportation, and are as much commercial intercourse" as moving
210 Id. (quoting Kidd, 128 U.S. at 22).
211 See id. at 16; see also id. at 42-43 (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("[T] he opinion of the
court in this case does not declare the act of 1890 to be unconstitutional .... [I]t is,
in effect, held that the statute would be unconstitutional if interpreted as embracing
such unlawful restraints . . ").
212 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
213 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 111. The Farmers' Alliance did lobby for the Sher-
man Act, but recall that in 1892 Weaver argued that the Act would prove ineffective
and should be trumped by public ownership. See supra notes 120, 122 and accompa-
nying text.
214 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 112. The author can personally attest that a compre-
hensive review of contemporary press reports disclosed hardly any interest in the case.
215 See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 19-21, 36, 45 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Fiss,
supra note 19, at 115 (stating that Harlan focused on the impact of the regulated
activity on commerce rather than on the activities that could be regulated).
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purchased goods.216 Moreover, Harlan said he was "unable to per-
ceive that [the Act] would imperil the autonomy of the States, espe-
cially as that result cannot be attained through the action of any one
State."21 7 Antitrust regulation was problematic for a state not only be-
cause a corporation could simply relocate, but because an attempt by
a state to regulate a trust's operation beyond that state's borders
might well run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 21
8
While Justice Harlan's dissent made reasonable points against the
Court's doctrinal analysis, he also engaged the broader constitutional
debate by adopting the Populist view of the commerce power. In
words that tracked the reasoning of James B. Weaver, Harlan said E. C.
Knight undermined one "primary object of the Union, which was to
place commerce among the States under the control of the common
government of all the people, and thereby relieve or protect it against
burdens or restrictions imposed, by whatever authority, for the benefit
of particular localities or special interests."219 More important, he re-
sponded to the majority's lecture against nationalizing industry by em-
bracing the reformers' call for action against the danger posed by the
growth of corporate power.220 Harlan argued that these "overshad-
owing combinations" were "governed entirely by the law of greed and
selfishness-so powerful that no single State is able to overthrow
them . . .and so all-pervading that they threaten the integrity of our
institutions." 221 Harlan's comments were ignored at the time, but a
few months later critics would be condemning him for espousing radi-
cal ideas from the bench. 222
In sum, the first encounter between the Justices and reformers
articulated significant limitations on federal power. As one might ex-
pect from an initial act of resistance, though, E.C. Knight took a mod-
est step in a conservative direction, as the lack of any hostile reaction
to the decision shows. Nonetheless, the process of mutual transforma-
216 E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 35-36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 37.
218 See id. at 37-38. This Catch-22, of course, would give no government the
power to regulate trusts. While that was not a foregone conclusion, Harlan was clearly
suggesting that E.C. Knight was driven more by a disagreement with the Populist
agenda than by federalism concerns.
219 Id. at 24; see supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
220 See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 43 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T] he general govern-
ment is not placed by the Constitution in such a condition of helplessness that it must
fold its arms and remain inactive while capital combines .. .to destroy competition,
not in one state only, but throughout the entire country . .
221 Id. at 44.
222 See infra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
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tion was at work within the Court as well, and the judicial resistance to
Populism was on an escalating path.
B. Debs and the Sword of Commerce
The Court was not done with the Commerce Clause, for soon
after the ruling in E.C. Knight the leaders of the Pullman Strike
brought their fight with President Cleveland to the Justices. For refus-
ing to obey the injunction against the strike, Debs and his cohorts
were found guilty of contempt and sent to jail.22 3 The prisoners
sought a writ of habeas corpus and assembled a crack legal team led
by former Senator Lyman Trumbull, one of the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the up-and-coming Clarence Darrow.
22 4 Yet
the Court unanimously upheld the President's actions and threw its
prestige behind his resistance to Populism.
225
While the din of politics was muffled in E.C. Knight, the advocates
for Debs used sharp language to inform the Justices that if they joined
the opposition that would only inflame public opinion. Trumbull told
the Court that "' [r] efusing to work for a railroad is no crime .... And
though such action may incidentally delay the mails or interfere with
interstate commerce, it being a lawful act and not done for the pur-
pose, it is no offense.'-"226 Meanwhile, his co-counsel warned that at-
tempting to crush the constitutional insurgents would only fuel
"'dynamic social forces until they gather an accumulated and resistless
energy by such compression, precipitate an explosion which shall wreck the
social order.' "'227 The Justices were approaching the same point of no
223 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1895).
224 See id. at 573 (noting that this was a habeas action); BRANDS, supra note 10, at
157; PAPKoE, supra note 90, at 71. For more on Trumbull's role in crafting the Four-
teenth Amendment, see Magliocca, supra note 16, at 933, 944-46.
225 Justice Harlan's vote to join the Court in this case is not surprising given his
relatively broad view of the commerce power. See supra notes 216-21 and accompany-
ing text.
226 BRANDS, supra note 10, at 158; see PAPE, supra note 90, at 63 (stating that up-
holding an injunction would "turn over the workingmen of this country, bound hand
and foot, to the mercy of corporate rapacity and greed" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
227 PAPKE, supra note 90, at 63 (emphasis added). An interesting aside is thatJus-
tice Harlan sensed this danger and, in a private letter to the judge presiding over the
Debs case, urged him to set aside the contempt order on remand. See LaRue, supra
note 20, at 390 ("'If Debs and his companions remain in jail during the summer, are
they not likely to be regarded as martyrs by a large number of people?... I take it that
you could, if you saw proper, set aside the order fining and imprisoning and dis-
charge the parties in contempt."' (quoting Letter from Justice John M. Harlan,
United States Supreme Court, to Judge W.A. Woods, United States Court of Appeals
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return that President Cleveland had faced two years earlier-should
they join the reformers and help modulate their demands, or fight
back and risk institutional damage from an enraged opposition bent
on changing the courts?
22 8
What made that choice remarkable was not the result but the
breadth of the ruling against the strikers. The circuit court upheld
the injunction under the Sherman Act because Debs and his union
colleagues were obstructing interstate commerce.2 29 Instead of adopt-
ing this modest approach, the Justices rested their conclusion on con-
stitutional grounds. 230 The Court framed the question as whether
"the relations of the general government to interstate commerce and
the transportation of the mails such as authorized a direct interfer-
ence to prevent a forcible obstruction thereof" without the need for
any statutory authorization. 23 ' In essence, the Court responded to the
strikers and their lawyers by pulling out its trump card-judicial re-
view-and writing limitations on strikes directly into the Constitution
for the first time.
This escalation was based on the innovative idea that the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause gave the President the power to remove pri-
vate as well as state-sponsored impediments to interstate commerce.
After noting that Article I, Section 8 expressly granted Congress au-
thority over commerce, the Court asked, "If a state with its recognized
powers of sovereignty is impotent to obstruct interstate commerce,
can it be that any mere voluntary association of individuals within the
limits of that State has a power that the State itself does not pos-
sess?" 23 2 Not only was the answer a resounding "no," but the Justices
offered a fervent defense of the President, stating that "[t]he strong
for the Seventh Circuit (May 28, 1895), in Alan F. Westin, The First Justice Harlan: A
Self-Portrait from His Private Papers, 46 Ky. LJ. 321, 359-60 (1958))).
228 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. The risk of institutional harm,
as opposed to damage inflicted on the substantive principles represented by the estab-
lished order, became a very real prospect in the 1896 campaign. See infra notes
322-31 and accompanying text.
229 See Debs, 158 U.S. at 600. The Court's course was even more problematic given
that the issue presented was whether there was jurisdiction to hear the habeas peti-
tion. See Fiss, supra note 19, at 61 ("According to the standard rule, the Court was not
to determine whether the injunction that Debs had disobeyed was appropriately is-
sued; . . . the only issue open for review was whether the circuit court had
jurisdiction.").
230 See Debs, 158 U.S. at 600 ("[W]e prefer to rest our judgment on the broader
ground which has been discussed in this opinion, believing it of importance that the
principles underlying it should be fully stated and affirmed.").
231 Id. at 577.
232 Id. at 581.
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arm of the national government may be put forth to brush away all
obstructions .... If the emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and
all its militia, are at the service of the nation, to compel obedience to
its laws."23
3
This cavalier dismissal of a state action requirement in Debs must
have come as a cruel joke to African Americans who were being
lynched at the time. 23 4 After all, a decade earlier in the Civil Rights
Cases235 the Court had held that even an express statutory authoriza-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment did not give federal prosecu-
tors the power to attack private racial discrimination in public
transportation, hotels, and other institutions. 23 6 The Commerce
Clause does not contain language suggesting a state action limit, but a
ruling that the negative implication of that text reached state and pri-
vate action was far from obvious and at odds with the deference given
to the states in cases such as E.C. Knight.23 7 The thread that con-
nected this new law together was hostility to the goals of Populism.
Congress did not possess the general power to regulate business as
reformers wanted, but the refusal of Congress to act did not prevent
the federal government from stopping strikes assisted by sympathetic
local governments.
The reactive quality of the Debs opinion was even more apparent
in its discussion of why an injunction was an appropriate remedy. Pe-
titioners argued that they could only be punished by the criminal law
and were being deprived of their right to ajury trial through equitable
contempt proceedings. Indeed, their brief stated that "[n]o more tyr-
annous and arbitrary government can be devised than the administra-
tion of criminal law by a single judge by means of injunction and
233 Id. at 582.
234 Ironically, Southern Populists were trying to stop the growing abuses of Jim
Crow. See The Georgia Populists Platform, reprinted in PEOPLE'S PARTY PAPER, Sept. 11,
1896, at 8 ("We condemn lynching and demand of our public servants the rigid en-
forcement of our laws against this barbarous practice."). Just as their economic de-
mands ended up backfiring, though, the Populist defeat would make racial
discrimination worse in the South. See supra note 9.
235 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
236 Id. at 24-25; id. at 11 ("It is state action of a particular character that is prohib-
ited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
amendment.").
237 The inconsistency between Debs and the Civil Rights Cases again explains why
Justice Harlan joined the former holding, since he dissented in the latter. See id. at
58-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that railroads, hotels, and public amuse-




proceedings in contempt."238 Furthermore, traditional principles of
equity provided that an injunction could not issue unless the ordinary
processes of law were not available. 239 In this instance, however, state
and federal tribunals were available; even if it was difficult to make out
a criminal case because-and this was a central point of Trumbull and
Darrow's argument-it was unclear that the strike leaders had violated
any law at all.
The answer was an extraordinary rebuke to popular govern-
ment-Debs said local juries could not be relied upon to punish peo-
ple who blocked interstate commerce, and hence, the ordinary
processes of law were not open. In the Court's view, "[i]f all the in-
habitants of a state, or even a great body of them, should combine to
obstruct interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails, pros-
ecutions for such offenses had in such a community would be doomed
in advance to failure."240 Unless federal officials had another means
of enforcing their will, "the whole interests of the nation in these re-
spects would be at the absolute mercy of a portion of the inhabitants
of that single state."2 41 This new and irrefutable presumption of jury
nullification is one illustration of how the Pullman Strike pushed
elites to rewrite the law out of fear that localism posed a threat to
property rights.
2 4 2
As the opinion reached its climax, the Court used blunt rhetoric
to tell the country that Populism should be resisted. Debs said that
"[i]f ever there was a special exigency, one which demanded that the
court should do all that courts can do, it was disclosed by this bill, and
we need not turn to the public history of the day, which only reaffirms
238 PAPKE, supra note 90, at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted); seeJosEPHSON,
supra note 166, at 606 (explaining that an injunction "was a formidable legal weapon,
making possible imprisonment for contempt of court without a hearing, and without
trial by jury, of those who organized labor action").
239 See Debs, 158 U.S. at 591 ("'[I] t is well settled that, as a general rule, equity will
not interfere, where the object sought can be as well attained in the ordinary tribu-
nals.'" (quoting Attorney Gen. ex rel. Gloucester City v. Brown, 24 N.J. Eq. 89, 91
(1873))).
240 Id. at 581-82.
241 Id. at 582.
242 See supra Part III.A.2. In the same landmark year of 1895, the Court held that
juries had no right to evaluate the validity of a law. See Sparf & Hansen v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895). When I was a student, I wrote aboutjury nullifica-
tion and was puzzled about why a custom of jury lawmaking that dated back to the
Founding came to an end at that time. See Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher's
Stone: Dualist Democracy and the Jury, 69 U. CoLo. L. REv. 175, 209 (1998). Now I am
persuaded that this was another byproduct of the Populist false positive, as the Court
was influenced by the threat of widespread civil disobedience to preclude resistance
from juries.
2oo6]
864 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81:3
with clearest emphasis all its allegations. '243 In addition, "it is a lesson
which cannot be learned too soon or too thoroughly that under this
government.., no wrong, real or fancied, carries with it legal warrant
to invite as a means of redress the cooperation of a mob, with its ac-
companying acts of violence." 244 This view was reinforced in the Chi-
cago Tribune, which hailed the case as "a notice to all Anarchists and
other disturbers of the public peace that the hands of the General
Government are not fettered."
245
Unlike E.C. Knight, which garnered no adverse reaction outside
of the Court, reformers vehemently objected to Debs. Governor
Altgeld denounced the Court for transforming the republic into gov-
ernment by judicial decree, and said that "'[t]he corrupt money
power has its withering finger on every pulse in the land.' ,,246 He
then lifted a quote from an antebellum critic of slavery and changed
"Slave Power" to "Money Power" before stating that "'[i] t sits in the
White House and legislates in the capitol. Courts of justice are its
ministers and legislatures are its lackeys.' ' 247 Debs asked why the
Court "'stab[bed] the Magna Charta of American liberty to death in
the interest of corporations, that labor might be disrobed of its ina-
lienable rights and those who advocated its claim to justice impris-
oned as if they were felons." 248 The answer, as should be clear by
now, is that in politics every action provokes a reaction, and Debs's
challenge was the cause of the Court's creation of new law to stop
him. A writer captured this by saying that "Debs, Altgeld & Co. have
thus unconsciously rendered the country a great service by their
course last year, for it is an immense gain to have so important a prin-
ciple of constitutional construction definitely settled.
' '249
C. The Pinnacle of Resistance: Pollock and the Income Tax
The final act of judicial opposition came in the Pollock cases chal-
lenging the federal income tax. These rulings were "preemptive opin-
ions," which are the most extreme examples of resistance
characterized by (1) a reckless effort to decide every issue in the case,
(2) the gross inflation of some established values in a way that targets
the opposition, and (3) an attack on precedent that is justified by a
243 Debs, 158 U.S. at 592.
244 Id. at 598-99.
245 The Debs Insurrection Unlawful, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 1895, at 6.
246 BRANDS, supra note 10, at 159.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 160.
249 The Week, NATION (New York), May 30, 1895, at 413.
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new normative approach to constitutional interpretation. 250 Some of
these traits were in E. C. Knight and Debs, but they reached their apoth-
eosis in Pollock. Not only was the Court told that its support was re-
quired to prevent a Populist takeover, but the opinion made it clear
that the Justices-or at least a majority of five-were willing to answer
this call in spite of a formidable array of contrary precedent.
1. Background on the Income Tax
The Pollock litigation stemmed from the enactment of a federal
income tax in 1894. A legislative coalition led by William Jennings
Bryan got behind a bill imposing a two percent flat tax on corpora-
tions and personal incomes over $4000.251 For the Populists, of
course, an income tax was central to their effort to redistribute wealth
and "the most effective weapon against Plutocratic policy. '25 2 Moder-
ates supported the tax to facilitate tariff reduction while ensuring that
the Treasury had the revenue to support the gold standard.253 Lead-
ing opponents such as Senator David Hill of New York responded that
the income tax was "'pressed upon Congress by a lot of Populists, So-
cialists, cranks, and disturbers .... It was class legislation of the worst
kind.' ,,254 When the bill passed, Cleveland was put in a difficult posi-
tion because he supported tariff reform notwithstanding his qualms
250 See Magliocca, supra note 16, at 900-03 (describing the idea of preemptive
opinions); see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (launching a
preemptive strike against the Republicans); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832) (taking the same action against Jacksonian Democracy); United States v. Cal-
lender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709) (ChaseJ.) (advancing a pre-
emptive opinion against Jeffersonian Democracy).
251 See ROBERT W. CHERNY, A RIGHTEOUS CAUSE: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS
BRYAN 45-46 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1994) (1985); KOENIG, supra note 60, at 130-33; see
also History of the Income-Tax Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1895, at 3 ("The authorship of the
income tax has been variously credited to Mr. McMillin of Tennessee and Mr. Byran
[sic] of Nebraska.").
252 KOENIG, supra note 60, at 130; see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
Granted, the 1894 tax was not progressive by modem standards, but it was an impor-
tant first step for establishing that principle.
253 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 78; see also KOENIG, supra note 60, at 130 ("In a
shrewd tactical move, Bryan sought to link the income tax to tariff reform.").
254 Senator Hill Is Elated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1895, at 3; see ELWELL, supra note 169,
at 3-4 (stating that an income tax would "change the character of the people, to
reorganize them also, changing honest citizens into perjured liars and to set loose on
the community a body of sneaking detectives").
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about progressive taxation. 255 In the end, he allowed the income tax
to become law but protested by refusing to sign the bill.
25 6
Though the debate on the income tax was hotly contested, there
was a broad consensus that the bill was constitutional. Only thirteen
years earlier, in Springer v. United States,257 the Justices unanimously
upheld an income tax imposed during the Civil War.2 58 Moreover,
the Court had never invalidated a federal tax on constitutional
grounds despite many invitations to do so. 259 These challenges all
said that the tax in question was governed by the Direct Tax Clauses of
Article I, which state that a head tax and other "direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several states.., according to their respective
Numbers. ''260 Pursuant to these provisions, a direct tax cannot be col-
lected unless it is divided among the states according to each state's
share of the population. As a practical matter, this rule would bar an
income tax by requiring that the rates assessed vary from state to state
in order to generate the proper amount of revenue.
261
One reason that the Court was reluctant to describe taxes as "di-
rect" was that the original purpose of the Clauses was to prevent the
taxation of slaves. In the first case interpreting these provisions, Hyl-
ton v. United States,262 Justice William Paterson, a member of the Con-
stitutional Convention, explained that they were written because the
South had many slaves and the North had few, hence " [t] he southern
states, if no provision had been introduced in the constitution, would
255 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 81. Cleveland did support an income tax on corpora-
tions, but was less keen on taxing individuals that way. See id. at 80.
256 See KOENIG, supra note 60, at 132-33.
257 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
258 Id. at 602.
259 See Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 351 (1874) (rejecting a challenge to
inheritance taxes); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869) (rejecting
a challenge to taxes on state bank notes); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433,
446 (1868) (upholding a tax on insurance premiums); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 171 (1796) (upholding an excise tax on carriages).
260 U.S. CONsT. art I., § 2, cl. 3; see id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein
before directed to be taken.").
261 This is because income levels vary by state. Consider two states with the same
population but different per capita incomes. Since the Direct Tax Clauses require
that each state contribute to such a tax based on its share of the census, each of these
two states would have to hand over the same amount of money. To accomplish this,
the tax rate in the poorer state would have to be higher than in the richer state, or
else the poorer state would have to make up the shortfall with other taxes. This would
be unfair and politically unacceptable. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174 (opinion of
Chase, J.).
262 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171.
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have been wholly at the mercy of the other states. Congress in such
case, might tax slaves."2 63 This reading is supported by evidence that
the Framers wanted to prevent sectional strife by forcing the entire
nation, North and South, to bear the burden of a slave tax. 264 Natu-
rally, the abolition of slavery erased this purpose and rendered these
Clauses a relic no different from the Fugitive Slave Clause.
265
Nevertheless, when a corporate shareholder objected to the in-
come tax and sought equitable relief in the courts, the great conserva-
tive lawyers of the day urged the Justices to give the Direct Tax Clauses
a new anti-redistribution reading.266 Joseph H. Choate, a leader of
the corporate bar, took on the case because he feared that unless he
built "'a rampart around the rights of property,"' Populists would es-
tablish a dangerous new order.2 67 He told the Court that upholding
the tax would be "'the beginning of socialism and communism"' and
would cause "'the destruction of the Constitution itself.'" 2 68 In re-
sponse to the argument that the Justices should stay out of the issue
because "opposing forces of sixty millions of people have become ar-
rayed in hostile political ranks upon a question which all men feel is
not a question of law, but of legislation," 269 Choate offered this emo-
tional peroration:
If it be true, as my friend said in closing, that the passions of the
people are aroused on this subject, if it be true that a mighty army
of sixty million citizens is likely to be incensed by this decision, it is
more vital to the future welfare of this country that this court again
resolutely and courageously declare, as Marshall did, that it has the
power to set aside an act of Congress violative of the Constitution,
263 Id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
264 See Ackerman, supra note 18, at 6-12 (summarizing the deliberations in the
Constitutional Convention).
265 See Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 684 (1895) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority "interprets constitutional provisions, originally designed to protect the slave
property against oppressive taxation, as to give privileges and immunities never con-
templated by the founders of the government"); id. at 687 (Brown, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the Direct Tax Clauses were "adopted for a special and temporary
purpose, that passed away with the existence of slavery").
266 Petitioner was a shareholder who sued to stop a corporation from paying the
income taxes that it owed. See Pollock I, 157 U.S. 429, 430 (1895). This looked like a
collusive suit, but the complaint stated that this was not the case. Id. at 433. The
prayer for relief asked that the corporation's officers be enjoined from paying the tax
because the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 434.
267 JOSEPHSON, supra note 166, at 610.
268 Id.
269 Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 531-32 (argument of Mr. Carter, Attorney for Appellee).
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and that it will not hesitate in executing that power, no matter what
the threatened consequences of popular or populistic wrath may be.
270
As Justice Harlan said in his dissent, Choate all but urged the Court
"to stand in the breach for the protection of the just rights of property
against the advancing hosts of socialism."
27 1
2. The Pollock Opinions
The Justices responded by issuing a set of opinions that declared
the income tax statute unconstitutional. In overturning a century of
doctrine, the Court deviated from professional norms to such an ex-
tent that Charles Evens Hughes called Pollock a self-inflicted wound on
a par with Dred Scott.272 This comparison is instructive, because in
both instances the Court was driven by the pressure of resistance to
cast aside precedent and deny its ideological foes a victory.
273
As an initial matter, the majority's holding that the income tax
law was invalid under the Direct Tax Clauses was ultra vires because
the courts had no authority to grant the relief sought. Petitioner was
asking that the income tax be enjoined.2 74 The problem with this re-
quest, as the dissenters loudly pointed out, was that a federal statute
barred courts from enjoining the collection of federal taxes. 275 In-
deed, the law was clear that the only route for an aggrieved taxpayer
was to pay the disputed tax and sue for damages. 27 6 Accordingly, the
proper disposition of the case was a dismissal without reaching the
270 Id. at 553 (argument of Mr. Choate, Attorney for Appellants) (second empha-
sis added).
271 Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 674 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
272 See CHARLES EvANs HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 52-55
(1936); Francis R. Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 9 HARV. L.
REV. 198, 198 (1895) (stating that the Court rendered "an opinion in which is laid
down a doctrine that is contrary to what has been accepted as law for nearly one
hundred years").
273 See Magliocca, supra note 16, at 919-23 (analyzing Dred Scott); supra notes
48-52 and accompanying text.
274 See Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 434; id. at 609 (White, J., dissenting) ("The bill
presents two substantial questions for decision: the right of the plaintiff to relief in the
form in which he claims it, and his right to relief on the merits.").
275 See id. at 609-12; see also id. at 653 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Giving due effect
to the statutory provision that 'no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court,' the decree below dismissing
the bill should be affirmed." (citation omitted)).
276 See id. at 610 (White, J., dissenting) ("'[T]he general government has wisely
made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a
condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the tax is
assessed.'" (quoting Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 89 (1875))).
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merits, as the Court did not have the power to grant the requested
relief. In essence, the Pollock litigation was brought in the wrong way.
To this objection, the Court responded that "the question of ju-
risdiction, for the purposes of the case, was explicitly waived on the
argument."277 Even assuming that a subject-matter jurisdictional de-
fect could be waived, which was highly dubious given the limited
scope of Article III courts, judges normally do not rule on major legal
issues unless they are clearly presented. Yet there was an odd symme-
try at work here. Debs said that courts had the equitable power to bar
strikes without statutory authorization, while Pollock held that an ex-
press statutory denial did not bar equitable relief against taxation.
Once again, the link tying these holdings together was an animus to-
wards the Populists. If the Court dismissed Pollock without reaching
the merits like it should have, then there would have been no occa-
sion for a broad ruling denouncing the insurgents' constitutional vi-
sion before the crucial 1896 election.
278
The Court began its substantive analysis in Pollock by quoting
Marbury v. Madison for the proposition that constitutional review is
"'the very essence of judicial duty."' 279 To a modern ear, this sounds
like boilerplate. In fact, this was another revolutionary step-like the
embrace of the Commerce Clause-that is obscured by the lack of
recognition given to the Populist false positive. Davison M. Douglas
points out that Marbuiy was never cited by the Justices in support of
judicial review prior to 1887, and most legal commentators referred to
277 Id. at 554 (majority opinion). The majority also suggested that this was a suit
to prevent the misappropriation of corporate funds rather than a claim to restrain tax
collection. See id. That argument is unpersuasive. Since the point of limiting the
judiciary's equitable power was to prevent tax collection from being hindered, al-
lowing an exception for corporate shareholders would seriously disrupt the federal
scheme.
278 More evidence that the majority was chomping at the bit to engage in an act of
heroic resistance was supplied by their decision to hear Pollock twice. During the first
argument, one Justice was ill and the Court reached a decision on only whether taxes
on income from real estate and municipal bonds were direct. See Pollock II, 158 U.S.
601, 618 (1895) ("Our previous decision was confined to the consideration of the
validity of the tax on the income from real estate, and on the income from municipal
bonds."); Fiss, supra note 19, at 76 (noting Justice Jackson's illness). When the ill
Justice returned, the Court granted a rehearing and ruled that all income taxes were
direct. See Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 618 ("We are now permitted to broaden the field of
inquiry . . . [to] a tax upon a person's entire income . . . ."). The Court was not
required to hear the broader argument again. But instead of confining itself to a
narrow holding, the Court asserted that its prior conclusions "must be enlarged by the
acceptance of their logical conclusions." Id. at 617.
279 Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 554 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
178 (1803)).
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the case as an authority only for original jurisdiction, writs of manda-
mus, or other technical matters.280 In the 1890s the case enjoyed a
revival, which Douglas attributes to the controversy surrounding Pol-
lock and the need to defend that opinion from Populist attacks.
281
Choate's oral argument was a prime example of that change in allud-
ing to Marbury as a way of reminding the Justices of their duty to act
even in the face of popular resistance. 28 2 That reference had an im-
pact, as Pollock marked the first time that the Court used Marbury as a
justification for voiding a statute.283 This illustrates the creative power
of mutual transformation better than any example discussed so far.
The Court's hunt for new authorities to fight a growing popular move-
ment led to the canonization of what is now the most famous case in
American law.
28 4
This novelty was followed by an even greater one, as the Justices
set aside longstanding doctrine and invalidated a federal tax for the
first time. Mustering a set of rather unimpressive quotes from some
Framers, some eighteenth-century economists, and some English
cases on direct taxes, the Court held that the Direct Tax Clauses were
designed "to prevent an attack upon accumulated property by mere
force of numbers."28 5 Indeed, these provisions were "one of the
bulkwarks of private rights and private property."286 I use "unimpres-
sive" to describe this claim because the majority ignored the purpose
of these clauses (i.e., to block a slave tax) while conceding that there
was no clear evidence to support the argument that income taxes were
direct.2 7 Besides, Justice Harlan's dissent observed that these materi-
280 See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The Emer-
gence of a "Great Case, " 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375, 376-77 (2003); see also id. at
382-86 (showing that treatise writers either ignored or dismissed Marbury).
281 See id. at 387-97 (discussing the link between the rise of Populism and the
canonization of Marbury).
282 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
283 See Douglas, supra note 280, at 395 ("[D]uring the ninety-two years between
Marbury and Pollock, the Court had never once seen it necessary when declaring a
congressional statute unconstitutional to defend its power to exercise judicial review
by reference to the authority of an earlier decision.").
284 See id. at 398-406 (describing the lavish attention given to Marbury and to
Chief Justice Marshall in the decade following the Populist defeat).
285 Pollock I, 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895); see id. at 559-69 (discussing the Framers
and the economists); see also Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 629-32 (1895) (discussing the
English authorities).
286 Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 583.
287 Indeed, the Court conceded that when a delegate at the Constitutional Con-
vention asked for "'the precise meaning of direct taxation. No one answered.'" Id. at
563 (quoting Mr. Madison's records); see id. at 614 (White, J., dissenting) ("[I]t will,
in my opinion, serve no useful purpose . . . to seek to ascertain the meaning of the
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als "have been several times directly brought to the attention of this
court" and were rejected every time.
288
The majority's behavior only got worse when it tried to run the
gauntlet established by the precedents declaring that only head and
land taxes were direct for constitutional purposes.289 In fact, the chal-
lenge for lawyers seeking to void the income tax was even more formi-
dable because the Court had often said that income taxes were not
direct.290 Pollock distinguished these cases by calling their direct tax
statements dicta.2 91 The Court had a tougher time dealing with Hyl-
ton v. United States292-the first case construing the Direct Tax Clauses
as applying to only land and people-and resorted to the strange
claim that "[t] he case [was] badly reported" and should not be read as
authority against extending those provisions to income taxes.293 As
for the Springer v. United States294 case that upheld an income tax, the
Court said this "grew out of the war of the rebellion . . . and aban-
word 'direct' in the Constitution by resorting to the theoretical opinions on taxation
found in the writings of some economists .. "); supra notes 263-65 and accompany-
ing text.
288 See Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 641 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
289 The view that land taxes were direct was well established as far back as the
Court's first interpretation of the Direct Tax Clauses. See Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) ("[T]he direct taxes contem-
plated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation . .. and a tax on land.");
Fiss, supra note 19, at 87. The rationale for calling land taxes direct was similar to the
one for slaves-it alleviated sectional strife by barring small states from abusing their
power in the Senate to tax large states.
290 See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) (upholding an
income tax and stating "that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are
only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate");
Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 347-48 (1874) (stating that a direct tax "does
not include the tax on income").
291 Compare Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 576-78 (discussing these cases only to dismiss
them), with Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 651-59 (Harlan,J., dissenting) (refuting that view of
the precedents).
292 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171.
293 Pollock I1, 158 U.S. at 626 (White,J., dissenting). Compare Pollock , 157 U.S. at
571-72 (arguing that Hylton "distinctly avoided expressing an opinion upon that ques-
tion or laying down a comprehensive definition, but confined [each] opinion to the
case before the court"), and Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 626-27 (White, J., dissenting)
(same), with Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 616-20 (White, J., dissenting) (explaining that Hyl-
ton's reasoning was contrary to the majority's analysis), and id. at 619 (stating that "the
decision in that case the legislative department of the government has accepted the
opinions ... as conclusive in regard to the meaning of the word 'direct'").
294 102 U.S. 586.
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doned as soon after the war was ended as it could be done safely. '295
By contrast, the present tax came "in a time of profound peace" and
this "furnishes an additional reason for circumspection and care in
disposing of the case."296 Yet nothing in Springer indicated that it
rested on an emergency rationale, and in any event is hard to see the
relevance of this distinction for the Direct Tax Clauses.297 Given this
performance, it is no wonder that the dissenters accused the Court of
threatening the rule of law.
298
Contemporary observers understood that the source of Pollock's
unholy trinity of errors-disregarding the Court's equitable limits, dis-
torting the original understanding of the Direct Tax Clauses, and ig-
noring layers of precedent-was the spirit of resistance against
Populism. Justice Field's concurrence was the most explicit about this
motivation, observing that "[t]he present assault upon capital is but
the beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others, larger and
more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of the
poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and bitter-
ness."299 With this statement, Field was acknowledging that the pro-
cess of escalation was well underway and that he was not going to just
stand by and watch. Instead, he called the income tax an "arbitrary
discrimination" and argued for the legal equivalence of racial, relig-
ious, and wealth discrimination.300
While Justice Brown's dissent denounced the influence of "the
spectre of socialism," 30 1 the real fireworks came from Justice Harlan.
The most effective way of conveying the impact of Harlan's dissent is
295 Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 573 (majority opinion) (quoting R.R. Co. v. Collector, 100
U.S. 595, 598 (1879)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
296 Id. at 574.
297 In a related case, the Court upheld the use of paper money during the Civil
War as a wartime exigency, which suggests that the omission of that explanation in
Springeris telling. See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 550-51 (1870) (ruling that
Congress has implied power in wartime that it would not have in peacetime).
298 See Pollock I, 158 U.S. at 662-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me that
the court has not given to the maxim of stare decisis the full effect to which it is enti-
tled."); Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 652 (White, J., dissenting) ("[L]et it be felt that on great
constitutional questions this court is to depart from the settled conclusions of its pred-
ecessors, and to determine them all according to the mere opinion of those who
temporarily fill its bench, and our constitution will .. .be bereft of value .
299 Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 607 (Field, J., concurring).
300 Id. at 596 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment should intervene
"[w]henever a distinction is made in the burdens a law imposes or in the benefits it
confers on any citizens by reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class legisla-
tion, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses, and to general unrest and distur-
bance in society").
301 Pollock I, 158 U.S. at 695 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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not with an exegesis of his text, but with a sampling of the critical
commentary. For instance, The New York Times said "[1]awyers who
have practiced for years before the Supreme Court say they never
before listened to such revolutionary statements from the bench. The
most rampant Populist could not have... shown greater contempt for
the views of the majority than Justice Harlan did in [his] long ha-
rangue." 30 2 Likewise, The Chicago Tribune noted that 'Justice Harlan
led off with a sensational address which will make him the Presidential
candidate of the Populist party next year if he cares for the empty
honor."30 3 Lastly, The Nation opined that "[t] he heat with which Jus-
tice Harlan expounded the Marx gospel from the bench showed that
the brake [on Populism] was applied none too soon. The Judge's ob-
servations on the need of the tax to keep the rich in their places was as
odd as anything that has fallen from a court."30 4 At this point, there
was no denying that the Court was now engaged in the broader consti-
tutional dialogue, with the majority of its members firmly in the con-
servative camp.
There was also no denying the fact, however, that mutual trans-
formation was working against the Populists. In 1893, there were no
legal impediments to strikes and clear precedent supporting the valid-
ity of the income tax. Now both acts were under a constitutional
shadow created by a resistance more interested in victory than in fidel-
ity.30 5 On the other hand, the controversy surrounding Pollock gave
the Populists new momentum as they approached the 1896 presiden-
tial election.30 6 Only the voters could settle this dispute, as one Popu-
list pamphleteer argued that "it is not only just but expedient that
incomes be taxed. I am aware that the people have heard from the
Supreme Court on this subject. The Supreme Court will hear from
the people in the near future."
30 7
302 Income Tax Law Dead, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1895, at 1.
303 Tax Is Knocked Out, Cm. TRiB., May 21, 1895, at 3.
304 The Income-Tax Decision, NATION (New York), May 23, 1895, at 394.
305 SeeJosEPHSON, supra note 166, at 611 (quoting the New York Tribune's view that
"'[t] he fury of ignorant class hatred. . . has dashed itself in vain against the Constitu-
tion of the United States' "); The Debs Insurrection Unlawful, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 1895, at
6 (noting that Pollock "is the second defeat the Populists and demagogues have met
with at the hands of the Supreme Court this year").
306 See, e.g., Alan Furman Westin, The Supreme Court, The Populist Movement and the
Campaign of 1896, 15 J. POL. 3, 22 (1953) (stating that Pollock became "a topic of
heated discussion in every bank, barbershop, and barroom").
307 JoRY, supra note 81, at 13.
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V. THE 1896 ELECTION AND THE COURT-PACKING DEBATE
This Part recounts the campaign between Republicans led by Wil-
liam McKinley and the Democrat/Populist coalition led by William
Jennings Bryan. One important facet of that campaign was the public
discussion of transforming the Supreme Court as the ultimate consti-
tutional remedy. Andrew Jackson did pack the Court in 1837 and
Franklin D. Roosevelt famously failed to do so in 1937, but 1896 was
the only time when the idea was debated in a presidential election
season.30 8 In effect, the parties were calling upon the American peo-
ple to render a final verdict on the great issue of the day: should the
Populist vision of egalitarian reform go forward or not?
A. The Fusion of Reform Forces
As Republicans were united behind a conservative platform, the
political intrigue in 1896 centered on whether the Democrats or the
Populists would be the main opposition party. Within Populist ranks,
there was a division between "fusionists" like James B. Weaver, who
thought the lesson of 1894 was that they could not win withoutjoining
forces with reform Democrats, and "middle of the roaders" like Tom
Watson, who wanted to stay independent and avoid a world where
"'we playJonah while they play whale."' 3 09 In the midst of this debate,
the party leadership made a crucial decision to hold its nominating
convention after the Democratic Convention.3 10 This left the initia-
tive with the Democrats, for if they adopted a pro-reform stance the
momentum for fusion would be tough to stop. And when the Demo-
crats met in Chicago-the center of the Pullman Strike-a combina-
tion of shrewd management and fiery oratory convinced the delegates
to nominate William Jennings Bryan on a platform that endorsed the
308 For more on Jackson's Court-packing scheme, see Magliocca, supra note 34, at
554-57 (summarizing the debate). See also Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176
(outliningJackson's court-packing plan). Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court-packing plan
was not discussed during the 1936 campaign.
309 See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 270 (quoting Tom Watson); SUNDQUIST, supra
note 63, at 152-53. Another factor was that the Party was divided between its western
wing, which cooperated with Democrats, and its southern wing, which had to cooper-
ate with Republicans against traditional southern Democrats. Consequently, a choice
for fusion was damaging for Populists in the South (and explains why people like
Watson were opposed). See ARNETT, supra note 186, at 190 (quoting Watson's edito-
rial against fusion).
310 Marion Butler was apparently behind this decision, and it was based on an
assumption that the Democrats would not choose a reform candidate. See HUNT,
supra note 62, at 95. If this premise had borne out, then the Populists, not the Demo-
crats, would have united reformers under their banner.
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goals of the agrarian movement. 311 Most Populists accepted the logic
of fusion and endorsed Bryan's candidacy a few weeks later.
312
Conservatives were stunned by this latest escalation of the crisis,
as their resistance had unified reformers rather than burying them.
The New York Times ran headlines such as "Bryan the Demagogue" and
"Logical Candidate of the Party of Fantastic Ideas," and in an editorial
said he "must at any cost and by whatever means are most effective be
beaten."313 The Philadelphia Press argued that "lIt] his riotous platform
is the concrete creed of the mob. It is rank Populism intensified and
edged with hate and venom. It rests upon the four corner stones of
organized Repudiation, deliberate Confiscation, chartered Commu-
nism, and enthroned Anarchy."3 14 Mark Hanna, who was McKinley's
campaign guru, said "(tihe Chicago convention from beginning to
end was in the hands of a clique of radicals and revolutionists ....
Altgeld [ ] and Bryan will never be allowed to wreck a nation they are
seeking to ruin."315 Even Theodore Roosevelt, who is now regarded as
a progressive, was aghast at Bryan's nomination and warned against
"'a red government of lawlessness and dishonesty as phantastic [sic]
and vicious as the Paris Commune itself.' "316
311 See DURDEN, supra note 14, at 112-25; KOENIG, supra note 60, at 178-208; see
also ARNETr, supra note 186, at 201 (laying out the many similarities between the Dem-
ocratic and Populist platforms). Governor Altgeld probably would have been nomi-
nated (at a convention in his state) had he been a native-born citizen. See BRANDS,
supra note 10, at 258; see also U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("No Person except a
natural born Citizen ... shall be eligible to the Office of President .. ").
312 See CHERNv, sup-a note 251, at 62-63 (explaining that the Populists endorsed
Bryan but nominated a different Vice President to preserve their independence).
313 See Bryan the Demagogue, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1896, at 3; The One Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1896, at 4; W.J. Bryan, Populist, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1896, at 1.
314 James A. Barnes, Myths of the Byan Campaign, in WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN AND
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1896, at 68, 73 (George F. Whicher ed., 1953) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see The Week, NATION (New York), July 16, 1896, at 39 (describing the
"overpowering necessity of keeping the Tillmans, Blands, Bryans, Altgelds, and the
indescribables who believe them to be statesmen, out").
315 They Fire on the Flag, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 1896, at 6; see GOP TEXTBOOK, supra
note 169, at 4 ("Its majority is simply a howling mob of Populists, free-silverites and
Anarchists, dominated by Altgeld .. . ").
316 SUNDQUIST, supa note 63, at 156; see Douglas Dutro Woodard, The Presiden-
tial Election of 1896, at 352 (Sept. 1949) (unpublished masters thesis, Georgetown
University) (on file with Georgetown University Library) (quoting Letter from John
Hay to Henry Adams (Aug. 4, 1896), stating that "'many worthy Republicans are
scared blue'"). Indeed, most of the great progressives, such as Robert La Follette,
Woodrow Wilson, and Louis Brandeis, worked against Bryan's election. See KEVIN
PHILLIPS, WILLIAM MCKINLEY 126 (2003) ("The year 1896, however, was not a time in
which progressivism could risk the boldness so easy in 1906 or 1909.").
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The nomination of Bryan shattered the party that President
Cleveland represented, and many Democrats walked out of the Chi-
cago Convention and formed a "Gold Democrat" ticket. Cleveland
himself opposed the takeover by the Populists and told his supporters
that "[a] cause worth fighting for is worth fighting for to the end."
317
At their convention, the Gold Democrats said "all good citizens of the
republic are bound to repudiate [Bryan's principles] and exert every
lawful means to insure the defeat of the candidates that represent
these false doctrines. '318 Moreover, their platform said "[t]he Demo-
cratic party has survived many defeats, but could not survive a victory
won in behalf of the doctrine and the policy proclaimed in its name at
Chicago." 319 The climax of the constitutional struggle was at hand, as
the power of mutual transformation was shearing away old loyalties
and reorienting the parties along the ideological fault line drawn by
the Populists. 3 20 As The Nation said, "[p]robably no man in civil life
has succeeded in inspiring so much terror, without taking life, as
Bryan." 321
B. Transforming the Supreme Court-The Final Flanking Maneuver
One portion of the Democratic platform that became a flash
point in the campaign concerned its response to Pollock, which was
widely interpreted as a promise to pack the Court with Populist Jus-
tices. 322 Specifically, one plank criticized Pollock and said it "is the
duty of the Congress to use all the Constitutional power which re-
317 JAMES LOWRY WHITTLE, GROVER CLEVELAND 239 (London, Bliss, Sands & Co.
1896).
318 W.D. Bynum, Chairman, Executive Comm. of the Nat'l Democratic Party, Ad-
dress Before the National Democratic Party (Aug. 17, 1896), in GOLD DEMOCRAT
TEXTBOOK, supra note 172, at 1, 4.
319 Id. at 6.
320 This was the result that Watson had predicted when President Cleveland
started on the path of resistance. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
321 The Week, NATION, (New York) Nov. 5, 1896, at 337.
322 This does not mean that the Court was the central issue of the campaign, Re-
formers put their focus on the unlimited coinage of silver. Indeed, the point of
Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech at the Democratic Convention was to make that ques-
tion the centerpiece of the election, and this had such a powerful impact that free
silver is now the chief thing the Populists are remembered for. See Bryan, supra note
66, at 772 ("You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns; you
shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold."). Though agrarian leaders saw this as
a winning issue, other activists worried that this was a flawed strategy because higher
prices held no appeal for urban voters. See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 282-83 ("[I]t
was hard for city-dwelling factory workers to get excited .... Higher prices for wheat
and cotton meant little to them except higher prices for bread and clothes."). Rich-
ard Hofstadter once said that this sort of poor choice was typical for Populists who
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mains after the decision, or which may come from its reversal by the
court as it may hereafter be constituted."3 23 Conservatives leapt on
this as the "smoking gun" indicating that the Populists were bent on
destroying the Constitution through revolutionary means.
324
In the view of many observers, this plank in the Democratic plat-
form meant nothing less than an end to judicial independence. The
Gold Democrats were especially concerned, contending that Bryan
"assails the independence of the judiciary by a covert threat to reor-
ganize the courts whenever their decisions contravene the decree of
the party caucus." 325 Indeed, the Gold Democrat vice presidential
candidate said that "the Chicago convention would wipe virtually out
of existence that Supreme Court which interprets the law, forgetting
that our ancestors in England fought for hundreds of years to obtain a
tribunal ofjustice which was free from executive control."3 26 Republi-
cans were also critical, and their campaign manual explained that
"[f]rom the days of Marbury v. Madison to those of the income-tax
cases, there have been many criticisms of the opinions of the Supreme
Court, but the platform at Chicago is the first party assault upon the
constitutional tenure of the Justices." 327 With this statement, we can
see that the rediscovery of Marbuiy now extended beyond the Court to
the electorate at large as conservatives asserted their alternative to the
Populist vision .328
The view that Bryan was planning to pack the Court was echoed
in the press, as exemplified by this cartoon that appeared on the cover
"had been subsisting for long years upon a monotonous diet of failure." HOFSTADTER,
supra note 10, at 102.
323 2 SCHLESINGER, supra note 12, at 1829.
324 SeeJ.S. BARcus, THE BOOMERANG, OR BRYAN'S SPEECH WITH THE WIND KNOCKED
OUT 43 (New York, J.S. Barcus & Co. 1896) ("It is not the fact that the Chicago plat-
form criticized the judiciary that has brought down our condemnation, but it is the
unwisdom and the un-Americanism of their implied threat to reconstruct the Su-
preme Court for partisan purposes."); ELWELL, supra note 169, at 3 ("Imbued with a
holy enthusiasm these zealots ... propose among their early doings to reorganize the
Supreme Court of the United States."); Woodard, supra note 316, at 352 (quoting
John Hay's view that Bryan sought the "'abolition of the Supreme Court'").
325 W.D. Bynum, supra note 318, at 4; see id. at 9 (stating that the Court's "inde-
pendence and authority to interpret the law of the land without fear or favor must be
maintained. We condemn all efforts to degrade that tribunal or impair the confi-
dence and respect which it has deservedly held").
326 Simon B. Buckner, Vice Presidential Nominee, Acceptance Speech at the Na-
tional Democratic Convention (Sept. 3, 1896), in GOLD DEMOCRAT TEXTBOOK, supra
note 172, at 22, 23.
327 GOP TEXTBOOK, supra note 169, at 139; see id. (quoting a prior statement by
Bryan in favor of a constitutional amendment applying term limits to Justices).
328 See supra notes 270, 279-84 and accompanying text.
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of Harper's Weekly on September 12, 1896, entitled "A Forecast of the
Consequence of a Popocratic Victory to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
' 3 2 9
FIGURE 1. "A FORECAST OF THE CONSEQUENCE OF A POPOCRATIC
VICTORY TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES"
I'
In this rendering, the Constitution is tossed to the ground by a Court
sitting under a skull-and-crossbones and including Chief Justice
Altgeld (standing in the center), "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman, the radical
329 HARPER'S WKLV., Sept. 12, 1896 (cover image).
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Governor of South Carolina, Eugene Debs (wearing the "King Debs"
crown), and Jacob Coxey (wearing a helmet for Coxey's Army).330
The message was clear: Bryan's plans for the Court were part of a scary
agenda that should be rejected at the polls.
3 3 1
Bryan denied that he was attacking judicial review, but he did not
hide the fact that he wanted changes in the Court. In a speech at
Madison Square Garden, the candidate explained that "[o]ur oppo-
nents endeavored to make it appear that the income tax plank of our
platform assailed the Supreme Court. This criticism was entirely with-
out foundation. The platform commended the income tax, and sug-
gested the possibility that the court might hereafter reverse its
decision and return to the earlier precedents." 3 32 After all, "[a] future
court has a right to declare a similar income tax law constitutional.
Even the present members of the court have a right to change their
opinions on this subject asjudges have in the past changed their opin-
ions."333 During another speech, Bryan made a classic legal realist ar-
gument, stating that "[t] he Supreme court changes from time to time.
Judges die or resign, and new judges take their places. Is it not possi-
ble, my friends, that future judges may adhere to the precedents of a
hundred years, instead of adhering to a decision rendered by a major-
ity of one?"3 34 This defense was a fascinating blend of law and politics.
In one sense, Bryan was saying that once the pressure of mutual trans-
formation was removed the Court might return to its senses and to its
precedents. At the same time, his comments left open the possibility
of making this change happen by appointing rabid Populists to the
bench as per the Harper's cartoon. 33
5
330 The busts above the Court are less interesting, but they represent Charles
Guiteau, the assassin of PresidentJames A. Garfield, and three of the anarchists con-
victed for taking part in the Haymarket Riot.
331 See, e.g., Bryan and Sewall, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1896, at 1 (declaring that Bryan
wanted "a packed Supreme Court"); The Nation's Honor Must Be Preserved, supra note
174 (noting that "Mr. BRYAN'S government would destroy that safeguard by packing
the Supreme Court with judges who would agree with the Constitutional views of the
legislative branch if that branch happened to be in the hands of the Populists"); The
Triumph of Sectionalism and Communism, HARPER'S WKLY., July 18, 1896, at 697 (stating
that the Democratic Party "announces its readiness to make war upon the Supreme
Court").
332 BRYAN, supra note 1, at 415.
333 Id. at 416.
334 Id. at 480.
335 There is no indication, except in the ambiguous language of the platform it-
self, that Bryan supported expanding the membership of the Court or ending judicial
review as some conservatives maintained.
20o6]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
What stands out about this debate is the willingness of both sides
to engage the voters on this central question. The cycle of escalation
begun by President Cleveland's decision to oppose the Populists in
1893 had culminated just three years later in a sharp ideological polar-
ization that forced the people to consider first principles anew, up to
and including the role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional
system. The time for political tactics was over; the voters were about
to return a decision.
C. The Outcome
With voter turnout reaching an astounding eighty percent, Mc-
Kinley carried the country and in the process realigned the electorate
in a conservative direction.336 The Republican margin was 600,000
votes out of 13.9 million cast, and Bryan lost in the Electoral College
by 271 to 176. 337 Reformers failed because their rural orientation did
not connect with urban citizens, as the Democrat/Populist ticket
failed to win any major city other than New Orleans. 338 Naturally,
conservatives breathed a sigh of relief, with The Nation opining that
" [w] e have escaped from ... an immense danger, the danger of hav-
ing our currency adulterated and our form of government changed,
and a band of ignoramuses and Anarchists put at the head of what
remained of the great American republic." 339 Principled resistance
had succeeded in turning back the agrarian charge.
Not only was this defeat decisive, but the 1896 election realigned
partisan loyalties and ushered in an era of Republican dominance.
There was no way to know this at the time, as a single election-like a
single opinion-cannot change the law by itself. When Bryan and Mc-
Kinley squared off again in 1900, however, the Republicans won by an
336 This record participation was the result of unprecedented mobilization efforts.
See CHERNY, supra note 251, at 69 (observing that 1896 saw the highest turnout of
eligible voters in any national election). Prior to 1896, presidential candidates did
not personally campaign because it was considered undignified. See BRANDS, supra
note 10, at 279-80. See generally JEFFREY K. TULls, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987)
(describing this aspect of presidential campaigning). Bryan demolished this taboo by
embarking on a whistle-stop tour that included six hundred speeches, and it is said
that five million people saw him speak. See BRANDS, supra note 10, at 281; CHERNY,
supra note 251, at 66. McKinley responded similarly, as the GOP brought thousands
of supporters to his house where they could hear the candidate. See BRANDS, supra
note 10, at 272-74; JONES, supra note 14, at 283-85.
337 CHERNY, supra note 251, at 70; SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 157.
338 CHERNY, supra note 251, at 70; JONES, supra note 14, at 345; see also SUNDQUIST,
supra note 63, at 162 ("The massive swing to the Republicans in the North was
predominantly urban.").
339 The Week, supra note 321, at 337.
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even greater margin.3'4° And over the coming years, the evidence
would accumulate that "the switching voters were not coerced into
voting for McKinley; they were converted."'34 1 The impact of this con-
version on the Populist Party was devastating, as they evaporated as a
force in American politics. By daring greatly and failing, the Populists
only solidified the grip of conservatives on power. The law pro-
nounced by the High Court would soon reflect the gravitational pull
exerted by this constitutional false positive.
VI. THE AGONY OF DEFEAT
This Part summarizes how doctrine was transformed by the Popu-
list failure. In particular, the text analyzes two opinions issued imme-
diately after the election that redefined the Fourteenth Amendment
in a manner consistent with the negative implication of Populism.
Then the text gives an explanation of how a false positive approach
offers the best explanation for these developments.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Rebom
The most important element missing in the story so far is the
Fourteenth Amendment. All of the great decisions issued in 1895 fo-
cused on provisions in the original Constitution (i.e., the Commerce
Clause and the Direct Tax Clauses). The argument over federalism
after the Pullman Strike, however, was about the appropriate role of
states in regulating property rights. Even if Populists were barred
from the levers of national power and federal courts could enjoin
strikes supported by local officials, reformers still had plenty of room
to develop their egalitarian economic policies at the state level. Recall
that in the Granger Cases the Supreme Court held that states were gen-
erally free-notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment-to exer-
cise their police power.342
Before McKinley was even inaugurated, however, the Justices ab-
ruptly changed course and issued two unanimous opinions holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed substantive limits on state
regulatory authority.343 These rulings, which came down on the same
340 CHERNY, supra note 251, at 89; cf JONES, supra note 14, at 346 ("[T] he skillful
leadership of McKinley and Hanna[ ] produced a combination of votes which gave it
the victory in 1896 and which promised Republican ascendancy for many years....").
341 SUNDQUIST, supra note 63, at 158; see id. at 159-69 (providing a close analysis of
the election returns and the partisan realignment).
342 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
343 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (hold-
ing that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Takings Clause); Allgeyer v.
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day, were shocking because the Court had repeatedly rejected this
construction of the Amendment in the past.344 For example, in the
Slaughter-House Cases345 -the first ones construing the Fourteenth
Amendment-the Justices held that neither the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause nor any other provision barred a state from creating a mo-
nopoly that excluded citizens from a trade.346 A few years later, in
Davidson v. New Orleans,34 7 the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause did not bar the states from taking
private property without just compensation. 34 While Davidson said,
consistent with past precedent, that there might be a constitutional
problem in an extreme case where a state just confiscated property
and gave it to someone else, as a practical matter the Court made it
clear that the states had wide latitude. 349 Indeed, the Court went out
of its way to express its exasperation with litigants who claimed that
the police power was restricted by the Due Process Clause, explaining
that "there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this pro-
vision as found in the fourteenth amendment."350
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment secured
the "liberty of contract"). Both cases were decided on March 1, a few days before
McKinley's inaugural.
344 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 79-81 (1947) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (laying out the history of this jurisprudence); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134
(1877) ("For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts."). There was one case before 1897 that voided a state railroad
regulation under a procedural due process theory. See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
345 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), abrogated by Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578.
346 See id. at 80-81. There were, of course, dissenting opinions that argued for
protection for property rights from state action. See id. at 96-101 (Field, J., dissent-
ing). Those contrary views, though, did not garner a majority until after the Populist
false positive.
347 96 U.S. 97 (1878), abrogated by Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226.
348 Id. at 104-05 (rejecting a due process attack on a state property assessment
scheme).
349 Compare Davidson, 96 U.S. at 102 ("It seems to us that a statute which declares
in terms, and without more, that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of
land, which is now in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would, if effectual, de-
prive A. of his property without due process of law. . . ."), with id. at 105 ("[Ilt is not
possible to hold that a party has, without due process of law, been deprived of his
property, when . . .he has, by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice,
according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case."). See also Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase,J.) ("[A] law that takes prop-
erty from A. and gives it to B ... is against all reason and justice . ).
350 See Davidson, 96 U.S. at 104.
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1. The Takings Clause Expands
Yet in its first blockbuster prior to McKinley's inaugural, the Jus-
tices overruled Davidson and held that the Fourteenth Amendment
extended the Takings Clause to the states. Asserting that "protection
of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital principle of re-
publican institutions," the Court in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail-
road Co. v. Chicago3 5 1 explained that "a judgment of a state court...
whereby private property is taken for the state or under its direction
for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner
is . . . wanting in the due process of law required by the fourteenth
amendment."3 5 2 The Court reasoned that if the pure confiscation
and transfer of property was suspect, as the earlier cases said, then
surely due process must be "applicable to the direct appropriation by
the State to public use and without compensation of the private prop-
erty of the citizen." 353 Of course, this is exactly the chain of logic that
Davidson had rejected twenty years earlier.
One potential explanation for this turnabout is that the Court
was finally implementing the will of the Fourteenth Amendment's
framers to incorporate the Bill of Rights. Assuming arguendo that this
represents the correct reading of the constitutional text, one would
then expect that Chicago would be followed by other cases extending
that principle to the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. But this did
not happen. Instead, three years later the Court held in Maxwell v.
Dow354 that the grand and petit jury requirements of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments were not extended to the states by the Four-
teenth.3 55 Furthermore, the Court rejected any evidence that the Re-
construction Framers wanted to incorporate the Bill of Rights, as
"[w] hat individual Senators or Representatives may have urged in de-
bate . . . does not furnish a firm ground for its proper construc-
tion."356 Justice Harlan, the lone dissenter in Maxwell, argued that the
majority's view was inconsistent with Chicago and observed that "it
351 166 U.S. 226.
352 Id. at 235-36, 241; see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 79-80 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting) (stating that Chicago "in effect, overruled" Davidson).
353 166 U.S. at 236. Thus, the Court did not say that it was overruling Davidson. In
fact, Justice Harlan implausibly cited Davidson as support for his conclusion. See id. at
235-36.
354 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
355 Id. at 595-96.
356 Id. at 601.
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would seem that the protection of private property is of more conse-
quence that the protection of the life and liberty of the citizen.
357
Since a general pursuit of incorporation cannot explain the ex-
tension of the Takings Clause to the states, the only other plausible
explanation is that the Court, as Harlan suggested, was now giving
property rights a privileged status against state action. The impor-
tance of Chicago should not be exaggerated, as the Takings Clause was
rarely invoked afterwards.3 58 There was no doubt, though, that some-
thing significant had changed in the wake of Bryan's defeat.
2. The "Liberty of Contract"
The companion case to Chicago was more consequential, as the
Court struck down a state regulatory statute with a novel theory that
the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a "liberty of contract." In All-
geyer v. Louisiana,359 Justice Peckham laid the groundwork for his
opinion in Lochner v. New York360 with words quoted at length in the
beginning of this Article: "The liberty mentioned in that amendment
means . . . [the right] to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, neces-
sary and essential . "..."361 Just as Chicago overturned Davidson, so
Allgeyer overturned Slaughter-House and its proposition that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not protect a right to pursue the butcher
trade or any other avocation.3 62 The Court also made it clear that this
357 Id. at 614 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan joined Chicago because he believed
that every part of the Bill of Rights applied to the states, not just the ones that protect
property. See id.
358 Indeed, Chicago itself held that the state action at issue was not a taking. 166
U.S. at 241-58; see also id. at 259 (Brewer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (rejecting the Court's analysis on the merits).
359 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
360 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
361 Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589; see also id. at 591 (describing the "liberty to contract").
This case involved a state law regulating marine insurance contracts with out-of-state
firms. For more on Allgeyer and Justice Peckham, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 43-46 (1990).
362 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 80 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that Allgeyer "substantially adopted the rejected argument of counsel in the
Slaughter-House cases, that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the liberty of all
persons under 'natural law' to engage in their chosen business or vocation"). This
sub silentio reversal of Slaughter-House is also relevant for the debate on incorporation.
Some scholars argue that Slaughter-House is consistent with a pro-incorporation view.
See Newsom, supra note 9, at 675-83; see also id. at 710-11 (explaining that counsel
raising incorporation claims relied on Slaughter-House for support). Newsom's claim is
that the standard reading of Slaughter-House as an anti-incorporation opinion actually
flows from Maxwell's misreading of the case. See id. at 742-44. Rather than arguing
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new restriction on state authority over property rights was open-en-
ded, for while states had a police power "[w] hen and how far such
power may be legitimately exercised with regard to these subjects must
be left for determination to each case as it arises. '363 The fears of
James B. Weaver and his Populist allies were realized, as a laissez-faire
philosophy was now firmly entrenched in the Constitution.
3 64
B. A Summary of the New Fourteenth Amendment
Upon reviewing the circumstances surrounding Chicago and All-
geyer, it is hard not to conclude that the Populist false positive was the
cause of the Court's final escalation in the constitutional process. To-
gether these decisions imposed robust limits on the regulation of
property in the public interest and struck at the heart of the Populist
ideology. The timing of these rulings, coming on the heels of Bryan's
defeat, suggests a causal relationship. And there are parallels between
the trio of great cases in 1895, which were about fighting Populism,
and the pair of remarkable cases in 1897, particularly in their cavalier
treatment of precedent. On the other hand, the need to resist Popu-
lism was greater in 1895 because the outcome of the presidential elec-
tion was still in doubt.
One explanation for the Justices' behavior is that they read the
election results as a vindication of conservative resistance and a signal
that voters wanted to move away from the rejected ideals of Popu-
lism. 36 5 Chicago and Allgeyer can be viewed as building blocks for a
new legal regime defined by the negative implication of Populism,
that the Court misconstrued Slaughter-House for some inexplicable reason, a better
explanation may be that Maxwell accurately reflected the fact that Slaughter-House's
interpretation of Reconstruction on all counts (race, incorporation, and property
rights) was repudiated by the Populist false positive. The text explains that this was
certainly true with respect to state property regulation, and the future articles in this
project will make the same point for incorporation and race. See supra note 9.
363 Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 590. It is not easy to reconcile Justice Harlan's views with
his decision to join Allgeyer. At best, one could say that Harlan construed the liberty of
contract narrowly, as demonstrated by his dissent in Lochner. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at
65-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
364 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
365 In fact, this was the era in which Finley Peter Dunne uttered his famous quip,
through the fictitious Mr. Dooley, that the Supreme Court "follows th' iliction [sic]
returns." FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1902). Dunne was com-
menting on the Court's decision in the Insular Cases, in which the Justices held that
the recent conquests from the Spanish-American War were not subject to a variety of
constitutional provisions. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). That case came
on the heels of Bryan's defeat in 1900, where he made anti-imperialism the theme of
his campaign against McKinley.
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which added to the Court's tentative steps in that direction in 1895.
This point comes into focus when 1897 is compared to the famous
"switch-in-time" of 1937. In each case, the Court overturned prece-
dent regarding the power of government to regulate property rights,
even though no constitutional amendment was enacted. To the ex-
tent that the shift during the New Deal was a product of external
forces, the explanation is that the Court was responding to a powerful
desire expressed by the electorate for a new governing framework.3 66
The Populist false positive did the same thing but in the opposite di-
rection. That process is harder to see because it was more attenuated
than the New Deal revolution. Ascertaining the meaning of the nega-
tive implication of Populism is a step removed from interpreting an
affirmative call for change.
The advantage of reading the Court's actions as an interpretation
of the Populist false positive is that it provides a more elegant explana-
tion than the competing alternatives. Indeed, the lack of attention in
constitutional theory to false positives leads scholars reviewing this pe-
riod into two false choices. The first is that the Court made gross
errors ofjudgment in cases such as Pollock and Allgeyer, which is exem-
plified by the criticism of the liberty of contract cases.3 67 There is
some truth in this observation, as was shown in the earlier discussion
of Pollock's flaws. 368 But it is hard to sustain the argument that this
Court was, for some reason, far more willing to impose its value judg-
ments and distort the law than courts of other eras. The second is
that the Fourteenth Amendment really did embody a laissez-faire
principle, and hence decisions such as Allgeyer and Lochner were cor-
rect.369 There is also some truth to this observation, since a text that
facilitated the shift from slave to free labor cannot be read as being
wholly indifferent to the issue of economic regulation. Unfortunately
366 In both the New Deal and Populist examples, the claim can be made that the
Court's actions were entirely driven by internal dynamics. Put another way, one can-
not dismiss the argument that Chicago and Allgeyer would have occurred even if the
Populists had not appeared. All one can do is evaluate the available evidence and ask
whether that explanation is persuasive given the magnitude of the change and the
circumstantial links between the Supreme Court's results and developments in the
political world. My view, after considerable reflection, is that, at least in the Populist
case, a purely doctrinal answer is not compelling.
367 See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DuKE L.J.
243, 244-45 (1998) (describing Lochner as a "paradigmatic example[ ] of what is not
the law").
368 See supra notes 272-300 and accompanying text.
369 See Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 340-41
(1992). See generally William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law
in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 767 (offering a defense of this position).
2oo6] CONSTITUTIONAL FALSE POSITIVES 887
for this position, there is no credible indication that the framers of
that Amendment wanted courts to exercise supervisory power over
state property regulation. Furthermore, this analysis provides no an-
swer for why the Supreme Court refused to construe the Amendment
as restrictive of the states' substantive police power until 1897.
Neither of these conventional explanations works because each
misses the big picture; it was the failure of Populism and the resulting
displacement of the law that accounts for the revision of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The evidence for this hypothesis is even more
powerful when one reflects on the other major developments at this
time. 370 For instance, the transformation of the Commerce Clause
from a backwater into the main provision for assertions of federal
power was not the product of a renegade Court or a rediscovery of the
original intent of that provision. The unprecedented authorization of
strike injunctions cannot be attributed to the idiosyncratic prefer-
ences of the Court given Grover Cleveland's role in opposing the Pull-
man Strike. Even the invalidation of the federal income tax, which is
the most suspect action in this era, is more consistent with systemic
opposition to Populism than with a willful act by some judges. In all
of these areas, the false positive of the 1890s set the standard for the
next forty years. The cord linking them together was the negative im-
plication of Populism.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional equivalent of the Punktation of Olmutz is the
defeat of the Populist Party. Proving that every action provokes a reac-
tion, the powerful reform initiative from the heartland sparked an es-
calating campaign of resistance through the Pullman Strike, the great
cases of 1895, and the debate over Court-packing. While the rewards
of leading a successful political movement are great, the risks associ-
ated with the failure of that effort are just as great. Ralph Waldo
Emerson's adage that "[w] hen you strike at a king, you must kill him"
was never more apt than in the 1890s, as the inability of the Populists
to overcome conservative resistance led to a dramatic shift away from
the goals of reformers.
37 1
The recognition that false positives have a profound effect on
doctrine not only clears away the fog that obscures our constitutional
history, but makes an important point that is lost in the modem dis-
370 Of course, the evidence considered here deals only with economic matters.
The hypothesis asserted in the text is even more convincing when the issues of race
and incorporation are added to the mix. See supra note 9.
371 ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SERGEANT, FIRE UNDER THE ANDES 315 (1927).
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cussion of judicial review. At most of the key turning points in the
path of the law, the Supreme Court resists the popular will at its peril.
In 1896, the American people held in their hands the power to assert
a contrary constitutional vision and made it stick. Accordingly, voters
hold the power to withdraw their mandate from decisions of the
Court that they disagree with. The Populist failure dramatizes the pit-
falls of challenging judicial supremacy, but that rugged path is still
open for every generation of reformers.
